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NOTES
THE PROBLEM OF WITHHOLDING IN RESPONSE TO




In today's increasingly competitive economy, businesses must enter
into long-term relationships with one another in order to survive. Like
many long-term associations these days, these sometimes break down.
When a business relationship is in the form of a continuing contract,1
and one party breaches the contract, the other party will often want to
withhold payment to compensate itself for its injuries while the perform-
ance under the contract continues. Although "the natural instinct" of an
injured party2 is to withhold payment,3 if the party does so, it will subject
itself to a great deal of uncertainty.
The uncertainties faced by a party considering withholding are demon-
strated by the predicament of the construction contractor in K & G Con-
struction Co. v. Harris.4 The contractor's excavation subcontractor had
breached its express contractual duty to perform in a workmanlike man-
ner by driving a bulldozer too close to a building under construction by
the general contractor. 5 This caused substantial damages when a wall
collapsed.6 The contractor was scheduled to make a progress payment to
the subcontractor the next day,7 and it had to decide whether to make
this payment despite the subcontractor's breach. The contractor wanted
the subcontractor to continue to perform under the subcontract and fin-
1. "Continuing contract," as used in this Note, means a contract for which there are
remaining performances and payments due. See infra part I.B.
2. This Note will use consistent terminology to describe parties involved in a with-
holding situation. "Breaching party" will describe the party who has committed the orig-
inal breach in response to which the other party may wish to withhold payment.
"Injured party" will describe the party against whom the breach has been committed and
who may wish to withhold payment. "Withholding party" will describe the injured party
after it has withheld payment.
Sometimes the withholding of payment will be considered to be a breach of the con-
tract. The terminology will remain the same, however, even though the "withholding
party" is also technically a "breaching party." In a limited number of situations, the
withholding party will withhold payment without any breach or justification by the other
party. Nonetheless, the terminology in those situations will remain the same for the sake
of consistency.
3. 6 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 887G, at 564 (Walter
H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1962).
4. 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960).
5. See id at 453-54.
6. See id. The accident caused S3,400.00 in damages. See idL at 454. The subcon-
tractor and its insurance carrier disclaimed liability for the accident. See id.
7. See id The progress payment was to be in the amount of $1,484.50. See id
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ish the excavation work. However, the contractor also wanted to make
sure that it was compensated for the damages it incurred as a result of
the subcontractor's breach. The contractor ultimately decided to with-
hold the progress payment, but notified the subcontractor that it wanted
the excavation to continue.8
The contractor's decision to withhold payment forced the subcontrac-
tor into its own predicament. The subcontractor had to decide whether
to continue to perform under the subcontract despite the contractor's
withholding of the progress payment. The subcontractor did not want to
work without getting paid, but it also did not want to be liable for any
damages for breach of contract by stopping work. The subcontractor
eventually decided to cease its performance under the subcontract.9
When the contractor then sued the subcontractor, the court was faced
with a case in which both parties had not satisfied the express terms of
the contract. The contractor withheld the contractually required pro-
gress payment and the subcontractor knocked down the wall and, later,
discontinued the contractually required excavation work. After assessing
the damages resulting from the bulldozer accident, the court had to de-
cide which party should be compensated for the other's breach.' 0 The
court determined that the contractor was allowed to withhold the pro-
gress payment in light of the subcontractor's initial breach."
Though more than thirty years have passed since K & G Construction
was decided, a contractor, a subcontractor, or a court in the same situa-
tion today would likely be faced with the same uncertainties. Courts
have applied several different standards to determine whether withhold-
ing 2 is proper1 3 in the absence of a contractual provision that addresses
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. If the contractor were liable, it would owe the amount of the withheld progress
payment and the subcontractor's profit on the remaining portion of the work. See id. at
453-54. The measure of damages for the subcontractor's claim for "lost profit" is fre-
quently stated as the remaining portion of the contract price less the remaining prospec-
tive cost of performance. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
Contracts § 14-28 (3d ed. 1987). In some cases, the measure of recovery may be the value
of the services provided to the party that was subject to the wrongful withholding. See
Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 573 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
If the subcontractor were liable, it would owe the additional costs incurred by the
contractor in hiring another subcontractor to complete the work, in addition to the costs
of the damaged wall. See K & G Constr., 164 A.2d at 453-54.
11. See K & G Constr., 164 A.2d at 456. The subcontractor was therefore found
liable for the costs the contractor incurred as a result of the subcontractor's work stop-
page. See id. For a description of the court's reasoning in this case, see infra notes 62-66
and accompanying text.
12. This Note will use the term "withholding" to refer to the withholding of payment
by a party injured by a breach while that party demands that the party which caused the
breach complete its performance under the contract.
This Note will use the term "cancellation" to refer to when "either party puts an end to
the contract for breach." U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (1990). After cancellation "all obligations
which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach
or performance survives." Id. § 2-106(3). Sometimes what is described in this Note and
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this question.14 Because of this, parties to continuing contracts face sub-
stantial risk when they make decisions concerning withholding following
a breach of contract.15
This Note explores the right of a party injured by a breach of a contin-
uing 16 general common-law 1 7 contract to withhold payment" without
releasing the breaching party from the performance of its contractual oh-
the UCC as "cancellation" is described by the terms "termination" and "rescission." See
2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.15 at 435 n.2 (1990).
13. See infra part I.C. Courts that are faced with the issue of withholding often do
not recognize its special characteristics and frequently decide cases without reference to
prior decisions in this area. Courts usually answer questions of withholding by direct
application of the principles of material breach and constructive conditions. See infra
part I.C. These principles were not designed to address the special problems that arise in
connection with a party's withholding of payment in a continuing contract. See infra
note 21 and accompanying text. When these principles are applied in the context of
withholding, they often generate inconsistent results. Often courts of the same state use
inconsistent standards in similar cases. Compare Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746, 749(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (allowing withholding when justified) with Cox, Colton, Stoner,
Starr & Co. v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 672 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. CL App. 1984) (party
must elect either to cancel contract or continue contract and give full performance; with-
holding not allowed). Occasionally, even the same court will even use different standards
in similar cases. Compare T. Ferguson Constr., Inc. v. Sealaska Corp., 820 P.2d 1058,
1061 (Alaska 1991) (allowing withholding when circumstances warrant) and Arctic Con-
tractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 43 (Alaska 1977) (same) with Howard S. Lease Con-
str. Co. & Assocs. v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712, 715-16 (Alaska 1986) (allowing withholding
after first material breach or if withholding is subsequently proved valid). For a discus-
sion of the different withholding standards, see infra part I.C. For a fuller examination of
the Texas conflict, see infra note 146. For a discussion of the standards applied in
Alaska, see infra note 101.
14. Contracting parties frequently insert provisions into their contracts that seek to
address this problem. See infra part II.C. However, there are many situations in which
parties do not provide for withholding in their contracts. See eg., ARP Films, Inc. v.
Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 952 F.2d 643, 646-47 (2d Cir. 1991) (copyright li-
censing contract with no withholding provision). Furthermore, parties to contracts that
do address withholding may find themselves in situations in which the withholding provi-
sions do not adequately address the breach. See, eg., K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164
A.2d 451, 452-53 (Md. 1960) (contract clause allowing contractor to retain 10% of pro-
gress payment until completion insufficient to deal with damages from major excavation
accident).
15. See infra part II.
16. The withholding analysis in this Note applies only to continuing contracts for
which there are remaining performances and payments due. See infra part I.B.
17. This Note discusses withholding in contracts interpreted under common-law con-
tract rules. Certain areas of the law have specialized rules regarding the withholding of
payment. For example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which covers the
sale of goods, has a provision which allows buyers to withhold from the unpaid purchase
price any damages resulting from the seller's breach. This provision is analyzed in this
Note because of the UCC's relevance to common-law contract law. See infra part I.D.
Other classes of cases where withholding is allowed include bankruptcy, insurance, and
banking. See 6 Williston, supra note 3, § 887G. In addition, there is a well-developed
body of law on the right to withhold rent under real estate leases under such theories as
illegal lease and implied warranty of habitability. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E.
Krier, Property 469-515 (2d ed. 1988). Moreover, in federal government contracts, with-
holding by the government is allowed pursuant to particular statutory procedures. See
Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (1988 & Supp. III 1992)); Avco Corp. v. United States,
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ligations. This right19 constitutes an intermediate step between the rela-
tively drastic alternative of cancelling all remaining performance and the
relatively ineffectual alternative of suing (or negotiating) for damages or
other remedies.2" Part I presents a general overview of the principles of
material breach and constructive conditions and describes the different
standards courts apply to resolve questions of withholding. Part II de-
velops an analytical framework for understanding the uncertainties fac-
ing parties in this situation and evaluates the withholding standards to
measure their success in minimizing these uncertainties. Part III pro-
poses a general standard that seeks to minimize the deficiencies of the
various conflicting standards. This Note concludes that the present dis-
array in the law concerning withholding causes unnecessary risk to con-
tracting parties and, until courts or legislatures act to mitigate this risk,
contracting parties must protect themselves by including withholding
provisions in their contracts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constructive Conditions and Material Breach
The well-developed contract law principles of material breach and
constructive conditions form the backdrop against which questions of
withholding are decided. Courts developed these principles "to deal with
the relatively simple case in which the party in breach had finished per-
forming and the injured party refused to pay the price because the per-
formance was defective or incomplete." 2'
Courts that examine issues of withholding usually do so by applying
the doctrine of constructive conditions, under which each contracting
party's duty to perform a contractual obligation is constructively condi-
tioned on the other party's substantial performance of the prior obliga-
tions under the contract.22 If a party fails to substantially perform the
10 Cl. Ct. 665 (1986). The right to withhold in these situations and many others which
arise under specialized bodies of law is beyond the scope of this Note.
18. This Note only considers the right of an injured party to withhold payment for a
breach in the performance of a contract. A similar analysis can be used to examine a
right of an injured party to withhold performance in response to a breach. Because of the
complexities of applying a general analysis to a subject as varied as contractual perform-
ance, the right to withhold performance is not considered in this Note.
19. The "right" to withhold or cancel a contract is not properly a right, nor is it a
remedy; it is a "legal privilege" and "a legal relation created for the benefit of the injured
party." 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 693, at 275 (1960). This Note, for
convenience, will describe withholding and cancellation as "rights" or as "responses" to
breach.
20. For a discussion of the traditional common-law responses to breach, see infra part
I.A.
21. 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.15 at 435.
22. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 & cmt. d (1979); Calamari & Pe-
rillo, supra note 10, § 11-17.
The Second Restatement sets forth the rules of material breach and constructive condi-
tions within Chapter 10, Topic 2, Effect of Performance and Non-performance. See Re-
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contract when its performance is due, the party has materially breached
the contract.23 In the event of a material breach,24 the constructive con-
dition of performance has not occurred." The injured party then has the
right to cancel the contract and terminate the remaining executory obli-
gations of each side.26 The injured party may then also sue the breaching
party to recover damages incurred as a result of the total breach of the
contract.27 An example of the operation of this doctrine is provided by
K & G Construction v. Harris,28 the case described in the Introduction. 9
In that case, the subcontractor's breach of its obligation to perform in a
workmanlike manner was considered by the court to be material.Y°
Thus, the contractor had the option to cancel all of the remaining obliga-
tions under the contract and sue for the remedies available for a total
breach.31
However, a party injured by a material breach is not required to cancel
the contract. Even though a constructive condition of performance has
statement (Second) of Contracts §§ 235-248 (1979). Calamari & Perillo's hornbook
provides a much more readable explanation of the operation of these rules. See Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 10, §§ 11-11 to 11-18; see also 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, §§ 8.8-
8.19 (additional description of these rules).
23. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. d (1979); Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 10, § 11-15. An exception may exist when there has been a delay in perform-
ance. If performance has been delayed for a reasonably short time while the time for
performance is not of the essence, a material breach has not occurred even though sub-
stantial performance has not been rendered. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-
18(a), at 461. In this case, the breaching party will have a reasonable time to cure the
breach. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 242 cmt. a (1979).
24. A discussion of whether a particular breach should be classified as material or
non-material is beyond the scope of this Note. For discussions of the determination of
when a breach is material, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1979); Restate-
ment of Contracts § 275 (1932); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 459-61;
2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.16; Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach
in the Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1073 (1988).
This Note does not consider the Second Restatement's position that a material breach
merely permits the injured party to suspend performance. The Second Restatement's
position allows the breaching party to cure the breach until enough time has passed that
cancellation is warranted. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 reporter's note,
§ 242 cmt. a (1979); see also 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, §§ 8.15, 8.18 (discussing this
analysis). For criticism of this analysis, see Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a),
at 459; William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts An Analytical Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70
Minn. L. Rev. 713 (1986).
25. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 & cmt. a (1979); Calamari & Pe-
rillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(b).
26. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225(2), § 237 cmt. a (1979); Calamari &
Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 458.
27. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243(1) & cmt. a (1979); Calamari &
Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 458. A claim for total breach is for damages based
on all of the remaining rights under the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 236(1) (1979).
28. 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960).
29. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
30. See K & G Constr. Co., 164 A.2d at 456.
31. See id
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failed,32 the injured party may elect to waive this non-occurrence of con-
dition.3" The injured party has the option of continuing the contract and
seeking damages from a non-material breach, rather than canceling the
contract and seeking damages from a total breach.34 For example, in
K & G Construction, even though the subcontractor's breach was mate-
rial, the contractor had the option to continue the contract and treat the
breach as non-material. 5 The contractor in that case exercised this op-
tion by permitting the subcontractor to continue its performance.3 6
If a breach of a contract is not material, substantial performance has
been rendered and the constructive condition of performance has been
satisfied.37 The injured party does not have the right to cancel the con-
tract; it may only seek damages for the non-material breach.38 For ex-
ample, if the subcontractor's breach in K & G Construction had been
non-material, the contractor would have had no right to cancel the con-
tract. Rather, the contractor could only have sought damages incurred
as a result of the breach.39
B. Where Questions of Withholding Arise
An examination of the manner in which the principles of material
breach and constructive conditions operate shows that the issue of with-
holding arises only when the contract and the breach have two particular
characteristics.' First, for a party to be able to withhold payment, yet
insist on the other party's performance of its contractual obligations, the
contract must be continuing; that is, it must require continuing perform-
ance and payments at intervals.4 This situation commonly exists in con-
32. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1979); Calamari & Perillo, supra
note 10, § 11-17.
33. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243 cmt. a (1979); Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 10, § 11-32.
34. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243 cmt. a (1979); Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 458, § 11-33, at 498.
35. See K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. 1960).
36. See id.
37. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 & cmts. a, d (1979); Calamari &
Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-15.
38. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 & cmt. a, § 243(1) & cmt. a (1979);
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 458.
39. See Craig Food Indus. Inc. v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 516, 550 (D.
Utah 1979).
40. "Withholding," as defined in this Note, refers to the withholding of payment on a
contract in reaction to a breach while requiring the breaching party to continue its re-
maining performance. See supra note 12. "Withholding," differently defined, may arise
in other types of contracts whose consideration is beyond the scope of this Note.
41. See supra note 1. If the contract calls only for a single payment after perform-
ance, the principles of constructive conditions and material breach are easily applied and
the question of withholding does not arise. Upon the completion of performance in such
a case, the withholding becomes cancellation, since withholding presupposes a demand
that the breaching party complete its performance. See supra note 12.
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tracts for construction,4 2  long term sales,43 equipment leasing,"
licensing,45  franchising,' employment,4' and covenants not to
compete.48
Second, the breach and withholding must occur before performance
under the contract has been substantially completed. If the breaching
party has substantially performed the contract by the time the withhold-
ing occurs, the only issue for a court to decide is the net recovery on the
contract, an amount that is usually held to be the balance of the contract
price reduced by the damages caused by the breach.49
Though the possibility of withholding arises when a continuing con-
tract has been breached before substantial performance has occurred, the
parties must follow a particular pattern of action in order for a court to
reach the issue of withholding. First, the injured party must elect to
withhold payment and require continued performance from the breach-
42. See, e.g., K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960) (construction
contract).
43. See; e.g., Created Gemstones, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 391 N.F_2d 987 (N.Y.
1979) (ten year sales agreement).
44. See, e.g., Royal McBee Corp. v. Bryant, 217 A.2d 603 (D.C. 1966) (typewriter
lease). These issues also arise in the leasing of real estate. However, courts have estab-
lished specialized rules regarding rent withholding and other real estate leasing questions.
Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 17.
45. See, e.g., ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 952 F.2d 643 (2d
Cir. 1991) (licensing of copyright rights of cartoon characters).
46. See; e.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies,
Ltd., 773 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. M11. 991) (franchise of cookie outlets).
47. See e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Bumagarner, 17 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962) (employment of movie actor).
48. See; e.g., Hanks v. GAB Business Servs., Inc., 644 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. 1983) (re-
strictive covenant in sale of insurance adjusting business).
49. See; e.g., J.E. Milligan Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Garbe Iron Works, Inc., 486 N.E.2d
945, 950 (1. App. Ct. 1985) (subcontractor that substantially performed entitled to "con-
tract damages reduced, of course, by any damages caused by negligence"). If both sides
substantially perform, the issues at trial are usually a claim by the breaching party for the
amount withheld and a counterclaim by the withholding party for the amount of damage
caused by the breach. See e.g., Sagebrush Dev., Inc. v. Moehrke, 604 P.2d 198, 203
(Wyo. 1979) (in contract with non-material breaches on each side, damages computed
based on each individual breach).
The court must return judgments on the claim and counterclaim, but usually it does
not need to consider whether the withholding was rightful or wrongful, since this has no
effect on the amount of thejudgments. However, there are some unusual times where the
rightfulness of withholding may have some effect, such as the award of consequential
damages. See; e.g., Howard S. Lease Const. Co. & Assoc. v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712, 715
(Alaska 1986) (consequential damages not awarded when withholding was found to be
proper). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
The issue of prejudgment interest on the amount improperly withheld is frequently
noted in cases. That issue is sometimes resolved by holding that the net judgment was
not liquidated and therefore not entitled to prejudgment interest. See Concannon v.
Galanti, 202 N.E.2d 236, 239 (Mass. 1964). However, in some states, prejudgment inter-
est is allowed on unliquidated contract claims. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 5001 (Mc-
Kinney 1992 & Supp. 1993). It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the effects of
withholding on this issue.
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ing party."0 Second, the breaching party must stop performance in re-
sponse to the withholding.5' If either of the parties do not take these
actions, a court would be unlikely to discuss whether a party would have
been justified in taking them. 2
C. Common Law Withholding Standards
Courts considering the issue of withholding in common-law contracts
have responded in a variety of different ways. The approaches taken by
courts may, however, be classified into three primary groups, referred to
in this Note as standards: withholding after material breach, withhold-
ing when justified, and election required. Some courts allow withholding
only when the breach by the breaching party is material.5 3 Others allow
the finder of fact to determine whether the withholding was justified and
do not apply the principles of material breach.54 Still others hold that an
injured party may not withhold, but rather require it to elect either full
performance or total cancellation.15
1. Withholding After Material Breach
Where courts apply the withholding after material breach standard,
withholding is allowed only after the conduct of the breaching party rises
50. If the injured party does not withhold, a court will rarely consider whether it
would have been able to withhold. Any discussion of the right to withhold by a court
would be pure dicta.
Parties that may be eligible to withhold often do not do so because of the risks that
withholding involves. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. If an injured party
does not withhold, it still has the right to sue for a non-material breach. See supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
If a party withholds and refuses to allow continued performance, a cancellation has
occurred. See supra note 12. In that case, the question becomes purely one of material
breach. See, e.g., Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecom. & Info. Sys., Inc., 788
S.W.2d 386, 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (when company was unsatisfied with equipment
installation and refused to pay or allow replacement, "only a material breach would pre-
clude recovery on the contract").
51. If the breaching party continues performance, it has effectively elected to treat the
withholding as a non-material breach, if it is a breach at all. See, e.g., Sagebrush Dev.,
604 P.2d at 203 (when breaching water service provider sued for withheld payments but
continued performance, there was no question of "total breach"). This deprives the court
of the opportunity to consider whether the breaching party could have canceled its per-
formance, as any discussion of the possibility of cancellation would be pure speculation
and dicta.
52. An exception would be found if, for example, the breaching party were to sue for
a declaratory judgment that it could cease its performance under the contract in response
to a withholding. Then a court would be able to consider whether withholding was
proper even though the breaching party had not yet ceased performance. See, e.g,, Craig
Food Indus., Inc. v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 516, 550 (D. Utah 1979)
(franchisor counterclaimed for declaratory judgment that franchise agreement was termi-
nated because of withheld franchise fees).
53. See infra part I.C.1.
54. See infra part I.C.2.
55. See infra part I.C.3.
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to the level of a material breach. 6 Using this analysis, a withholding is
appropriate after a material breach,17 since the constructive condition to
the injured party's- performance has not occurred.s 8
Under this standard, if a material breach does not precede a withhold-
ing, the withholding itself is considered a breach of the contract 9 This
analysis would, however, require the first breaching party to tolerate a
withholding that is not a material breach of the contract." In such a
situation, the first breaching party may not respond by ceasing its per-
formance, because the withholding does not constitute a material breach
that would allow the first breaching party to cancel the contract.
61
An example of how a court applied the withholding after material
breach standard can be found in K & G Construction v. Harris.62 In that
case, the subcontractor's bulldozer accident was found to be a material
breach of the contract.63 That material breach by the subcontractor was
held to excuse the contractor's failure to make the progress payment."
56. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. b (1979); 2 Farnsworth, supra
note 12, § 8.15, at 439-40. This standard considers whether the breach that preceded the
withholding or the withholding itself constituted a material breach. The withholding
after material breach standard is also referred to as the "first material breach" standard.
See 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.15, at 439-40.
57. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. d (1979); see also, eg., Ernst v.
Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 590 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (government
agency entitled to withhold progress payments from contractor who abandoned job site).
It is generally held to be immaterial whether the withholding party knew of the breach
before the withholding. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. c (1979).
58. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
59. See, ,,g., M & W Masonry Constr., Inc. v. Head, 562 P.2d 957, 961-62 (OkLa. Ct.
App. 1976) (holding that contractor improperly withheld payments to subcontractor that
had substantially performed).
60. An initially breaching party could, however, sue the withholding party for dam-
ages. In return it would be subject to a counterclaim for the damages resulting from the
original breach. See Sagebrush Dev., Inc. v. Moehrke, 604 P.2d 198, 203 (Vyo. 1979)
(breaching water supplier sued homeowner for withheld payments; homeowner counter-
claimed for damages from breach of supply contract).
61. See, eg., Stewart v. C & C Excavating & Constr. Co., 877 F.2d 711,714 (8th Cir.
1989) (contractor's withholding of relatively small portion of total payment was non-
material breach and did not entitle subcontractor to abandon job).
62. 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960). The facts of K & G Construction were described in the
Introduction. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
63. See K & G Constr., 164 A.2d at 456.
64. See id. In finding that the withholding was proper, the court relied on a quotation
from section 708 of Corbin, which states:
"The failure of [the subcontractor's] performance to constitute 'substantial' per-
formance may justify [the contractor] in refusing to make a progress payment
If the refusal to pay an installment is justified on the [contractor's] part,
the [subcontractor] is not justified in abandoning work by reason of that refusal.
His abandonment of the work will itself be a wrongful repudiation that goes to
the essence, even if the defects in performance did not."
Id. (omission in original) (quoting 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 708). However, the lan-
guage omitted by the court explains that refusing to pay progress payments without ter-
minating the contract is only allowed because "the time for curing defects may not have
expired." 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 708. The court's analysis is criticized for this
reason in Andersen, supra note 24, at 1131 n.182, 1122 n.149.
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Though the court considered the breach to be material, the court allowed
the contractor to treat the breach as non-material and required the sub-
contractor to continue performance. 65 Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that the subcontractor breached the contract again when it
discontinued work, and therefore was liable for the contractor's in-
creased cost of procuring substitute performance.66
The other side of the withholding after material breach standard is
illustrated by M & W Masonry Construction, Inc. v. Head,67 in which a
withholding was disallowed when a breach was held to be non-mate-
rial.68 In M & WMasonry, a masonry subcontractor stopped work and
sued after it had not been paid any progress payments.69 The contractor
explained its non-payment by claiming that "the brickwork was faulty-
some were crooked and some had head joints that were not full."70 The
court, after beginning its analysis with the oft-stated proposition that fail-
ure to pay a progress payment is a material breach of the contract,7
noted that "the stated rule contemplates that the subcontractor has sub-
65. See K & G Constr., 164 A.2d at 456. In finding that the contractor could treat the
breach as non-material, the court relied on another section of Corbin, section 954, which
it quoted as stating that" 'For a failure of performance constituting such a 'total' breach,
an action for remedies that are appropriate thereto is at once maintainable. Yet the in-jured party is not required to bring such action. He has the option of treating the non-
performance as a 'partial' breach only ... .'" Id. (omussion in original) (quoting 4
Corbin, supra note 19, § 954 at 830). The court omitted the end of the last sentence,
which states that the consequence of exercising this option is that the injured party may
"get[ ] a judgment therefor without barring a later action for some subsequently occur-
ring breach. It is reasonable for him to expect performance of the remainder of the con-
tract as agreed and to ask a judicial remedy in case of disappointment." 4 Corbin, supra
note 19, § 954 at 830.
66. See K & G Constr., 164 A.2d at 456.
67. 562 P.2d 957 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
68. See id. at 961-62.
69. See id. at 959-60.
70. Id. at 959. The contractor also complained about the color of the brick. How-
ever, the contractor had furnished the brick and the court did not consider this to be as
an excuse for non-payment. See id.
Even though the contractor had complaints about the subcontractor's brickwork, the
contractor told the subcontractor to continue working and that other work would be
approved. See id. The subcontractor continued its performance and corrected items on
the "punch list," a construction term for a list of items needing correction. See id. The
subcontractor requested a progress payment on May 3. See id. The payment should have
been paid five days later, but the contractor neither paid nor supplied an additional punch
list. See id. The only explanation given by the contractor for the withholding was, "We
can't give you no money because your work's unsatisfactory." Id. Neither the subcon-
tractor nor the architect could find anything wrong with the work. See id.
The subcontractor pulled its men off of the job on May 11 after the contractor again
refused to make the progress payment. See id. A few days after the subcontractor termi-
nated performance, the contractor requested a weekly payroll report for the job. See id.
The court dismissed any consideration of whether the failure to supply this report ex-
cused the progress payment by saying the request was "somewhat of an afterthought,"
because the contractor never complained of not having the report before. Id. at 961.
71. See id. at 961. The court cites five cases from different jurisdictions to support
this statement. See also 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 692, at 269 n.34 (citing over 30 cases
from 18 jurisdictions for the same proposition).
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stantially fulfilled mutual and dependent obligations required of him."'
The court held that the subcontractor had substantially performed its
obligation and therefore had a right to quit work when not paid."
Accordingly, the court found the subcontractor to be entitled to be paid
the money withheld and not liable for breach in terminating its
performance.74
One variation of the withholding after material breach standard allows
withholding which might otherwise be a material breach if such with-
holding resulted from a good faith difference in the interpretation of the
contract. In Golf Carts, Inc v. Mid-Pacific Country Club,7- the court
applied this variation to a dispute over the duration of an oral modifica-
tion of a contract.76 The modification increased the percentage of the
72. M & WMasonry, 562 P.2d at 961. The court cites no authority for this proposi-
tion. See id. Corbin points out that in a construction contract completion of a specified
portion of the work is a condition precedent to the right to a progress payment, but only
cites one case for this proposition. See 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 692, at 273; cf. Mor-
gan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (general rule is that unjustified
refusal or failure to pay installments is breach). But cf U.C.C. § 2-612(3) (1990) (in
installment contract there is breach of the whole contract only when "default with re-
spect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract").
73. See M & WMasonry, 562 P.2d at 962. The court found that the contractor had
offered no evidence that the subcontractor's work was anything but satisfactory. See id.
The contractor did, however, offer the excuse that it had not received progress payments
from the owner covering the work. See id. The subcontract stated that the payments to
the subcontractor were to be made "as and when Contractor receives payment from the
Owner for the work performed and materials furnished hereunder." Id at 958. The
court found the contractor's statement that he did not receive payment for the brickwork
until "45 to 60 days after we submitted our estimates" to be, if true, an unexplained
breach of the prime contract. Id. at 962. The record indicated that the contractor had
received payments for the materials it had furnished, and the court found that a "(Qailure
to timely request of owner payment for [subcontractor's] work" to be a breach of an
implied obligation of the contractor. Ie Moreover, the court found that it was "quite a
coincidence" that the contractor received payment for the brickwork shortly after the
subcontractor terminated, but still made no effort to pay the subcontractor. Id.
74. See id. at 962. The subcontractor sued to recover only the S10,810 it had re-
quested as a progress payment. See id. at 958. The court reversed the trial court's hold-
ing that the contractor was to receive its excess cost in completing the subcontract. See
id at 962.
A similar illustrative case that applies the withholding after material breach standard is
Stewart v. C & C Excavating & Construction Co., 877 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1989), in which a
subcontractor also stopped work after a contractor withheld a progress payment. The
subcontractor maintained that he had earned over $129,000 on the subcontract without
receiving a progress payment. See id. at 714. The court found that, because of certain
expenses that the contractor paid on behalf of the subcontractor, the net progress pay-
ment due was only $2,385.78. See id Upon concluding that the wrongful withholding of
this relatively small amount from a gross progress payment of $41,335 did not constitute
a material breach of the contract, see id. at 714, the court awarded the contractor dam-
ages covering the additional costs it incurred in completing the project. See id at 713-14.
75. 493 P.2d 1338 (Haw. 1972).
76. See id at 1339. Golf Carts, Inc. and the country club were involved in a contract
in which Golf Carts had a concession to rent golf carts for use by the country club's
members and guests. See id. at 1338.
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rental revenue to which Golf Carts, Inc. was entitled."' Golf Carts with-
held this higher percentage and remitted the remainder to the country
club, even after the country club claimed that the modification had ex-
pired.7" Golf Carts sued the country club for reformation of the contract
in accord with the modification.79 After extensive settlement negotia-
tions were unsuccessful, the country club canceled the contract and
evicted Golf Carts. 0 The court found the country club's cancellation to
be a breach, reasoning that Golf Carts' continued performance and with-
holding of revenues under its own good faith interpretation did not jus-
tify the country club's termination."' The court found the cancellation at
that time improper even though Golf Cart's interpretation was later
proved incorrect.8 2
2. Withholding when Justified
A second standard used by the courts allows withholding when the
finder of fact determines that the withholding is justified. This determi-
nation is made without applying the doctrine of material breach or exam-
ining the materiality of the breach which prompted the withholding.83
Courts applying this standard have approved jury instructions that treat
77. See id. at 1339. The effective period of the modification was not discussed by the
parties, and the modification was never reduced to writing. See id.
78. See id. Since the period of the modification was not reduced to writing, its dura-
tion was uncertain. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1340.
82. See id. The court found that the evidence of the duration of the modification was
ambiguous, and concluded that the modification was only in effect while the parties
abided by it. See id. at 1339. A dissent argued that Golf Carts failure to remit the
amount which the court found was due was a material breach which would justify the
termination. See id. at 1341 (Levinson, J., dissenting).
The good faith variation was also applied in Oak Ridge Construction Co. v. Tolley, 504
A.2d 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), in which a contractor and an owner got into a dispute
over the depth of a well the contractor was drilling for the owner. See id. at 1345-46.
There, the contract provided that the contractor was to drill a water well 150 feet deep.
See id. at 1345. If the well were required to be deeper than that, the contract provided for
an additional charge per foot. See id. The well was eventually drilled to a depth of over
800 feet. See id.
The owner objected to an additional charge for the well being drilled deeper than speci-
fied in the contract, and refused to pay the charge pending arbitration. See id. at 1345-
46. After the contractor submitted an invoice for the additional drilling, the owner wrote
to the contractor saying that the charges were "in dispute or disagreement" and that all
work on the well was to cease until resolution pursuant to an arbitration clause in the
agreement. Id. at 1345.
The contractor then terminated the contract, see id. at 1346, relying on a clause which
permitted it to terminate, upon notice, for any breach by the owner. See id. The court
found that the refusal to pay and request for arbitration were not breaches justifying the
contractor's termination, even though the owner's objection to the charge for the addi-
tional drilling had no merit. See id. at 1347-48.
83. See, e.g., Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 340 A.2d 225, 232-33
(Md. 1975) (affirming trial court's finding that withholding was justified, but not examin-
ing materiality of breach).
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the determination of whether a party was justified in withholding pay-
ment as entirely a question of fact."
The withholding when justified standard asks the finder of fact to ap-
ply its own uncontrolled judgment as to whether the withholding party
was justified in its withholding. In contrast, the withholding after mate-
rial breach standard asks the finder of fact to apply the established tests
used to determine whether a breach is material,85 and then, to use that
determination to conclude whether the withholding was appropriate. 86
A good example of how the withholding when justified standard is
applied is Morgan v. Singley,s7 in which a subcontractor ceased perform-
84. See, eg., Shafer Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 742 S.W.2d
717, 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (approving jury instruction asking whether "the Plaintiff
was justified in abandoning the job because of the failure of the Defendant... to pay
Plaintiff?").
85. Although there is no general test to determine whether a breach is material,
courts regularly determine the materiality of a breach by considering various circum-
stances attending the breach. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1979). The
details of the determination of whether a breach is material is beyond the scope of this
Note. See supra note 24.
86. Although these two standards depend on different determinations to be made by
the finder of fact, it is obvious that, when applied, they frequently will come to the same
result. For example, in K & G Construction Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 453-54, 456
(Md. 1960), the court approved the contractor's withholding of a $1,484.50 progress pay-
ment after the $3,400.00 bulldozer accident by applying the withholding after material
breach standard. It seems likely that a jury considering the same facts under the with-
holding when justified standard would also approve such action.
There are some situations, however, in which the two standards would arrive at differ-
ent results. For instance, in Oak Ridge Construction Co. v. Tolley, 504 A.2d 1343, 1345-
46 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the case described in note 82, supra, the owner withheld pay-
ment and attempted to invoke an arbitration clause in a dispute over the contractor's
charge for additional well drilling. The court found that the owner had no valid grounds
for its claim that the additional charge was improper. See id. at 1347-48. The court
applied the good faith variation and found that the contractor had no right to terminate
the contract after the owner's good faith withholding, even though the withholding was
premised on an invalid claim. See id. at 1347. If the court had applied the first material
breach standard and a jury had found that the owner's withholding based on an invalid
claim to be a material breach, the withholding would have been found improper and the
contractor's subsequent termination would have been allowed. In contrast, a jury con-
fronted simply by the question of whether the owner was justified in withholding in good
faith might find the owner to be justified and the contractor therefore liable for the dam-
ages from its termination.
Some courts seem to have brought the two standards together and found that the that a
finding of justification implies a material breach. See, eg., Automated Housing Corp. v.
First Equity Assocs., Inc., 428 A.2d 886, 888 (N.H. 1981) (conclusion by lower court
that subcontractor was justified in walking off job implies finding that contractor materi-
ally breached contract); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecom. & Info. Sys., Inc.,
788 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "only a material breach would
preclude recovery on the contract," but approving jury instruction stating that "[b]reach
of contract is the unjustified failure of one of the parties to the contract to perform"
(emphasis added)). Nonetheless, this Note distinguishes the two standards because of the
differences in the way that they treat breaches and the way they allocate the risks between
the parties. See infra part II.D.
87. 560 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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ance after the contractor withheld two progress payments.88 The con-
tractor contended that it withheld the payments because of defects and
deficiencies in the subcontractor's work. 9 The jury found that the sub-
contractor "had abandoned his work without justification."90 It found
that the subcontractor had failed to perform according to the plans and
specifications of the job, and that such failure caused the contractor to
incur costs to complete the work.9' On appeal, the subcontractor argued
that the failure to make the progress payments was a breach and justified
the abandonment of the job.92 The appellate court disagreed, holding
that only an unjustified withholding would constitute a breach,93 and
that if the subcontractor was not in compliance with the specifications of
the contract, the contractor's withholding would have been justified.94 It
therefore affirmed the jury's finding that the subcontractor's performance
was defective.95 The appellate court affirmed this finding without consid-
ering whether the subcontractor's breach was material.96
Another illustration of the justified standard can be found in Bart Ar-
conti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc.,9 ' a case in which a contractor
withheld payment in response to a subcontractor's persistent delays in
performance.98 The trial court, sitting without a jury,99 found that the
88. See id. at 748. Singley, the contractor, was, in fact, the plumbing, heating, and air
conditioning subcontractor to a general contractor. Morgan was Singley's subcontractor
for the plumbing portions of the job. See id.
89. See id. The subcontractor asserted that any defects had been remedied by the
time he left the job. See id. There was also conflicting testimony as to whether the gen-
eral contractor had paid Singley and whether such payment was made conditional on the
subcontractor's correction of the defects. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id. The jury also found that the subcontractor had substantially completed a
portion of the project, and was thus owed the remainder due on that portion, less the cost
incurred to complete full performance. See id.
92. See id. at 748-49.
93. See id. at 748-49.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 748-49. The court based its analysis on a quotation from Corbin:
"If the refusal to pay an installment is justified on the owner's part (Singley in
our case), the contractor (Morgan in our case) is not justified in abandoning
work by reason of that refusal. His abandonment of the work itself will be a
wrongful repudiation that goes to the essence, even if the defects in performance
did not."
Id. (parentheses supplied in original) (quoting 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 708, at 333).
In using this quotation the court ignores Corbin's immediately preceding paragraph,
which states that the failure of the contractor to provide substantial performance is whatjustifies an owner's refusal to make a progress payment. See id.; 3A Corbin, supra note
19, § 708, at 332; cf supra note 64 (discussing the application of this section in K & G
Construction).
97. 340 A.2d 225 (Md. 1975).
98. See id. at 228-29. The subcontractor's performance continued until a labor strike
intervened. See id. at 229. The contract had a provision that, in the event of a strike, the
contractor would have the right to perform the subcontractor's work and charge the
subcontractor for the cost of completion. See id. at 228. When the strike began, the
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contractor was justified in withholding the progress payments." The
appellate court affirmed this finding without making any mention of the
materiality of any breach. 01
contractor refused to make a progress payment which covered work the subcontractor
had performed before the strike. See id at 229.
The contractor was particularly concerned about the progress of the subcontractors
performance, since its general contracts provided that time was of the essence and sub-jected it to liquidated damages if the projects were not completed on time. See i. In the
general contracts labor strikes were not an excusable cause of delay. See id.
99. See id. at 227.
100. See id. at 232.
101. See i. at 232-33. The appellate court found that the subcontractor's refusal to
work during the strike was not itself a breach, because of the strike provision in the
contract. See id. at 232. However, the court found that its delays in performance and
refusal to cooperate with the contractor in finding an alternative to a work stoppage
constituted a breach. See id. at 233. The court's decision did not discuss the materiality
of the breach. See i.
The Supreme Court of Alaska used a related standard, replacing the justified question
with a test that limits withholding to "circumstances which clearly warrant it." Arctic
Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 43 (Alaska 1977). These circumstances have
included a party's failure to obtain required bonding, see id. at 43-44, protection against
liability to material suppliers, see United States ex rel D'Agostino Excavators v. Hey-
ward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1085-86 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021
(1971), and a manifest inability to complete the contract, see T. Ferguson Constr., Inc. v.
Sealaska Corp., 820 P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Alaska 1991). Under this standard, the court
examines a particular situation and balances the policies favoring withholding in that
particular circumstance against a general policy of "limiting the right to withhold pay-
ments." Arctic Contractors, 564 P.2d at 44. For instance, in Arctic Contractors, the
court balanced "the policy behind limiting the right to withhold payments against the
policy behind requiring payment and performance bonds on public contracts." Id
A different standard was applied by the Alaska Supreme Court in Howard S Lease
Constr. Co. & Assocs. v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1986). The test applied in this case
combined the withholding after material breach standard with the justified standard. See
i. at 715-16. Under this hybrid test, in addition to allowing withholding under the mate-
rial breach standard, an injured party is justified in withholding such an amount that is
necessary to compensate it for the injuries it received as a result of the other party's
breach. See id. at 715-16. However, this approach assigns the withholding party "the
risk of guessing wrong as to... whether the [withholding] is valid." Id. at 716.
In Howard S. Lease, a contractor performed work that was the subcontractor's respon-
sibility under the contract and withheld payment for the cost of that work. See id. at 714.
The court, calculating the difference between the amount that should have been withheld
and the amount actually withheld, found this difference to be S767.1 1. See id. at 716.
The court held that this amount was small enough that a wrongful withholding of it was
merely a non-material breach of the contract. See id. Accordingly, the court denied the
subcontractor damages for consequential injuries it suffered because of the withholding.
See iL
Apparently, in Alaska, withholding is allowed if it qualifies under either of the two
standards: the Arctic Contractors "circumstances which clearly warrant it" test or the
Howard S. Lease combination test. T Ferguson Construction, the latest Alaska case to
address this issue, applies the Arctic Contractors "clearly warrant" test, but notes Howard
S. Lease and its combination standard. See T. Ferguson Constr., 820 P.2d at 1061 n.10.
The Supreme Court of Alaska has attempted to address the issue of withholding by
reaching fair results in the cases which have come before it. However, the tests which
these cases spawn provide no coherent scheme by which withholding may be considered.
As the Alaska standards have limited applicability, the risks involved with them will not




Applying a third approach, some courts have held that a contracting
party injured by a material breach cannot withhold payment while de-
manding continued performance, but must instead make a definite elec-
tion between two alternatives: cancellation of the contract or affirmance
with full performance. If the injured party cancels the contract, it termi-
nates the remaining obligations on both sides. If the injured party affirms
the contract, it must continue its own performance in order to require the
breaching party to continue its performance as well.' 2 Upon affirmance,
the injured party may, however, maintain a suit for non-material
breach. 103 Under this analysis, an injured party that withheld payment
of a material amount would be foreclosed from any remedy for the other
party's termination of its performance, because a court would treat the
withholding as a cancellation of the contract."°
The election standard was applied in ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel En-
tertainment Group, Inc. ,10 which involved a dispute over the film rights
to well-known comic book characters.10 6 In this case, ARP brought suit
against Marvel, the owner of the rights to the characters, correctly alleg-
ing that Marvel's distribution of videocassettes featuring the characters
violated ARP's exclusive license to use the characters in films.'o 7 During
the course of the dispute, Marvel sent ARP a letter purporting to termi-
nate this licensing agreement. 0 8 Despite the receipt of this letter, ARP
continued to market its films and collect commissions,"' 9 but it soon be-
gan to withhold the licensing payments which were due Marvel.'" 0 The
court held that by continuing its performance in marketing its films,
ARP had made an election to affirm the contract and treat the termina-
102. See, e.g., ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 952 F.2d 643,
649 (2d Cir. 1991) (after finding affirmance of contract, holding plaintiff's refusal to pay
impermissible).
103. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 236 cmt. b (1979).
104. See id.
105. 952 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1991).
106. See id. at 646. The defendant, Marvel, had a licensing agreement with the plain-
tiff, ARP Films, which granted ARP the exclusive right to produce and exploit cartoon
films featuring Spiderman and other cartoon characters whose copyrights were owned by
the defendant. See id.
107. See id. When efforts to agree on the videocassette rights failed, ARP sued Marvel
alleging that Marvel had breached the licensing agreement. See id. Marvel claimed that
ARP had no videocassette rights and that ARP had breached the agreement. See id. The
jury found that ARP had the rights to distribute the videocassettes, see id. at 648, a
finding that was upheld on appeal. See id. at 651.
108. See id. at 647. The termination letter operated as a repudiation, which is a mate-
rial breach of the contract. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 12-4(a).
109. See ARP Films, 952 F.2d at 647. The termination letter offered to allow ARP to
continue to distribute the films on a "courtesy" and "at will" basis if all procedures under
the agreement were followed. See id. By continuing to distribute the films and collect
commissions, ARP was treating the termination as a non-material breach. See id. at 649.
110. See id. at 647. ARP also ceased providing Marvel with required reports of their
marketing activity. See id.
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tion letter as a non-material breach.'' The court found that, having
elected to treat the termination letter as a non-material breach, ARP had
renounced its ability to withhold payment under the contract.'" 2 Thus,
ARP was not permitted to withhold payment even though it suffered
significant injuries as a result of Marvel's breach of the exclusive licens-
ing agreement. 113
D. Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code takes a liberal view in al-
lowing a buyer of goods to withhold damages resulting from the seller's
breach." 4 Given the Code's widespread applicability" 5 and broad sub-
ject matter coverage," 6 an examination of its withholding provision is
useful for providing a counterpoint to the common-law standards. Fur-
thermore, courts often apply UCC solutions to problems that arise in
common-law contract settings." 1 7
Courts have broadly construed Article 2's withholding provision, sec-
tion 2-717, to allow withholding when it is commercially reasonable.I"
Under section 2-717 the buyer may deduct from the unpaid purchase
111. See id, at 649.
112. See id
113. See id at 648.
The election standard was also applied in White River Development Co. . Meco Sys-
tems, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), which involved a dispute between a
developer and a general contractor that had contracted to build a condominium complex
for the developer. See id at 736. The structures built by the contractor contained signifi-
cant instances of deficient workmanship, much of it irreparable. See id. at 740-41. These
problems prompted the developer to withhold payment from the contractor. See id. at
737. The court found that the developer's withholding of the payments entitled the con-
tractor to cease its performance, see id. at 742, even though the developer's damages from
the contractor's breach exceeded the amount withheld. See id. at 737, 742.
When the developer withheld payment and demanded that the contractor continue its
performance, the court treated the withholding as an election to cancel the contract,
excusing the contractor from further performance. See id at 742. Under this decision,
the developer withheld damages and tried to have the contractor complete its perform-
ance. Because the developer withheld, not completing its performance, the court held
that the contractor was entitled not to complete its performance. See id. For the devel-
oper to have had the contractor complete the job and be fully compensated, it would have
had to make full payment to the contractor, without withholding, and sue the contractor
for non-material breach.
114. See U.C.C. § 2-717 (1990).
115. Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted in every state except Louisiana, as well as
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Uniform Commer-
cial Code, Table of Jurisdictions Wherin Code has been Adopted, I U.LA. 1, 1-2 (Supp.
1993).
116. Article 2 of the Code covers all transactions in goods. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
117. See, eg., Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (apply-
ing U.C.C. §§ 2-609, 2-610 to transaction for sale of real estate); see generally Daniel E.
Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39
Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1971) (discussing applicability of UCC to general contract law);
Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise For Judicial Reasoning, 65 Colum. L
Rev. 880 (1965) (same).
118. See, eg., Carbontek Trading Co. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., 910 F.2d 302, 305-06
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price all damages resulting from any breach of contract by the seller,
provided that sufficient notice is given to the seller.' 19 The official com-
ment to that section makes two points: the buyer is allowed to withhold
all damages 2 ' incurred under the same contract, 12 1 and the buyer must
give notice of this withholding to avoid being in default. 22
(5th Cir. 1990) (allowing of withholding of price reduction for non-conforming coal when
alternatives not were commercially reasonable).
119. Section 2-717 of the Code provides: "The buyer on notifying the seller of his
intention to do so may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any breach of
the contract from any part of the price still due under the same contract." U.C.C. § 2-
717 (1990).
120. The official comment points out that this section allows the deduction of damages
resulting from any breach by the seller. See U.C.C. § 2-717 cmt. 1 (1990). This section
expands the scope of the earlier Uniform Sales Act withholding provision, which limited
withholding to damages from breach of warranty. Id.
121. "[T]he breach involved must be of the same contract under which the price in
question is claimed to have been earned." Id. cmt 1.
122. See id. cmt. 2. However, "no formality of notice is required and any language
which reasonably indicates the buyer's reason for holding up his payment is sufficient."
Id.
Most of the case law which interprets this section has been concerned with the points
which are raised in the section's official comment. The case law construing this section
has held that the buyer must show that it incurred damages based on a breach of contract
which was caused by the seller. See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Larry H.
Wright, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 14, 19-20 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (holding that evidence of tamper-
ing with gas meters was not breach of contract without evidence of who caused tamper-
ing). In Columbia Gas the court noted that UCC § 2-717 "is not a general set-off
provision permitting a buyer of goods to adjust its continuing contract obligations ac-
cording to the equities perceived by the buyer. The buyer must incur damages from a
breach of contract before UCC § 2-717 permits it to deduct anything from the contract
price .... " Id. at 20.
In addition, the breach must be of the same contract as that under which the buyer is
withholding its damages. See, eg., Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Prods., Inc., 750 F. Supp.
81, 89 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding contracts for lemon concentrate and tomato paste to be
different, even though negotiated at same time); Hellendall Distribs., Inc. v. S.B. Thomas,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 573, 574-75, (E.D. Pa. 1983) (distributorship agreement held to be
different contract than contract for sale of goods under distributorship), aff'd, 755 F.2d
920 (3d Cir. 1985); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Arkin-Medo, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (App.
Div. 1982) (same), aff'd, 448 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1983).
Further, the buyer must give the seller reasonable and timely notice of its withholding.
See, eg., M.K. Assocs. v. Stowell Prods., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 20, 21-22 (D. Me. 1988)
(holding notice improper and when first notice was in answer to complaint); Quaker Al-
loy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1319, 1344 (N.D. I1. 1988) (denying
withholding when notice of breach was in "reactive counterclaim after suit was filed");
Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (buyer
need not explicitly declare amount withheld, but must notify seller that it is withholding
because of breach). In M.K. Associates, the court found the policies behind timely notice
to be "first, to enable the seller to cure or replace, second, to give the seller an opportu-
nity to prepare for negotiation and litigation, and third, to ensure finality." M.K. Assocs.,
697 F. Supp. at 21.
Courts often interpret section 2-717's notice requirement in conjunction with the notice
requirement found in section 2-607(3), which bars any remedy for breach unless the
buyer notifies the seller of the breach within a reasonable time after discovery. See, e.g.,
M.K. Assocs., 697 F. Supp. at 21-22 (applying §§ 2-717 & 2-607). The comment to that
section points out that the notice should "let the seller know that the transaction is still
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II. RISK IN WITHHOLDING
Every time a party makes a contract, it faces some uncertainty.'"3
Although that party hopes for a successful, profitable contractual rela-
tionship, the unexpected may occur. 24
When a contracting party is faced with a breach of contract by the
other party, uncertainties beyond those considered in the contract sur-
face, because the injured party has not received its expected, contracted-
for performance. 2 If the breach causes harm, the injured party may not
be fully compensated for that harm. 2 ' Moreover, the breach, even if it is
minor, may be an indication of other breaches to come.' 27 Further, if the
injured party has to make a decision regarding the contract, it may be
unsure of the consequences of that decision.' 28 The party may not know
what legal standard a court will use to determine the propriety of that
decision.'29 Even if it does know what legal standard the court will ap-
ply, it may be unsure how the court will apply that standard to the par-
troublesome and must be watched" and that notice "opens the way for normal settlement
through negotiation." U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1990).
The one other question of interpretation that this section raises is a procedural point.
When, after withholding, a buyer sues for breach and the seller counterclaims for the
price of the goods, or vice versa, the seller often seeks summary judgment on its claim for
the price of goods delivered. Courts have generally denied summary judgment, holding
that section 2-717 operates to extinguish the seller's right to the price of the goods deliv-
ered to the extent that the seller has caused damages by the breach. See, e.g., Created
Gemstones, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 391 N.E.2d 987, 989-90 (N.Y. 1979) (denying
summary judgment on counterclaims for price of goods until after trial on claims for
breach); Pacific W. Resin Co. v. Condux Pipe Sys., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 313, 316-18 (D. Or.
1991) (holding same and collecting cases on this issue).
123. See Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty & Contract Law, 46 U. Pitt. L Rev 75, 77-83
(1984).
124. See Arthur I. Rosett, Contract Performance" Promises, Condition and the Obliga-
tion to Communicate, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1083, 1083 (1975).
125. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1095.
126. This uncertainty results from many factors: the extent of the damages may not be
determinable when the breach occurs; the cost of its effects may not be quantifiable; it
may cause irreparable harm for which there is no adequate compensation; and the inci-
dental effects of the breach to the injured party and others may never be known. Even if
the harm from the breach may be quantified into a monetary amount, the injured party
still may not be fully compensated, as the breaching party may be unwilling to pay imme-
diately the injured party the full amount of its injury.
If the injured party sues for compensation, it still may not be fully compensated: the
full amount of the injury may not be compensable as damages at law; the party may incur
uncompensated legal expenses; and the litigation may not be fully successful. See Seita,
supra note 123, at 106-08. Even if a judgment is obtained, it may be uncollectable.
The risk engendered by the uncertainty of compensation is analyzed in this Note and
referred to as the compensation risk. See infra part II.A.l.
127. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1096. The risk engendered by the uncertainty of
future performance is analyzed in this Note and referred to as the performance risk. See
infra part II.A.1.
128. See Seita, supra note 123, at 80.
129. See Seita, supra note 123, at 109; supra note 13 and accompanying text. The risk
engendered by the uncertainty of the legal standard to be applied in future litigation is
analyzed in this Note and referred to as the rule determination risk. See infra part II.A.2.
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ticular facts of its case. 130
When a contracting party confronts a decision about the withholding
of payment on a continuing contract, this uncertainty becomes more pro-
nounced. This part analyzes the risks which result from the uncertainties
a party encounters when it faces a decision about withholding. This part
further examines the ways in which parties react to these risks, and the
manners in which the various legal standards distribute, and in some
cases amplify, the risks the parties encounter.
A. Classifications of Risk
Both an injured party in a position to withhold payment on a continu-
ing contract and a breaching party whose payment may be withheld face
significant risks. These risks result from both the hazards of the situation
the parties are in,1 31 and the perils of the legal consequences of their
decisions. 132 These two types of risk may be identified as the situational
risk and the legal risk.
1. Situational Risk
a. Injured Party
A party, injured by the breach of a continuing contract and consider-
ing whether to withhold, faces considerable situational risk. Situational
risk is caused by the uncertainties inherent in the situation that the party
is in. The injured party's situational risk results from two factors: the
risk that it will not be compensated for the breach which has occurred,
and the risk that the other party will not complete its performance, fur-
ther breaching the contract. 133 These two components of a party's situa-
130. See Seita, supra note 123, at 109-11. The risk engendered by the uncertainty of
how a legal standard would be to be applied to a particular factual situation is analyzed in
this Note and referred to as the fact application risk. See infra part II.A.2.
131. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
Professor Andersen has identified two interests which may be impaired when a con-
tract is breached: the interest in present performance and the interest in the likelihood of
future performance. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1095-1101.
The interest in present performance comes into being when performance is due. When
a party breaches, this interest is impaired because the party has not received the perform-
ance which it is owed. See id. at 1095. The risk that the impairment of this interest will
not be compensated is identified in this Note as the compensation risk.
The interest in the likelihood of future performance comes into being when the con-
tract is formed. See id. at 1096. When parties form an executory contract, they do so in
order to secure the benefits of confidence about probable future performance. This confi-
dence allows the parties to plan for the future. See id. at 1096-97. This interest is not
limited to the likelihood that the other party will perform. A party may have a substan-
tial interest in being able to plan its future duties. See id. at 1097.
When a breach occurs the interest in the likelihood of future performance may be
impaired. See id. at 1096; see also id. at 1099-1101 (examples of how breaches may im-
pair this interest). The risk that this interest may be substantially impaired is identified in
this Note as the performance risk.
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tional risk may be identified as the compensation risk and the
performance risk.
The injured party's compensation risk results from its uncertainty
about whether it will be compensated for the damages it has incurred
from past breaches. An example of compensation risk may be seen in
K & G Construction."M In that case the contractor faced the risk that it
would never be fully compensated for the injuries that it suffered as a
result of the subcontractor's breach of its duty to perform in a workman-
like manner.13 5 The subcontractor and its insurance company had dis-
claimed liability for the accident.1 36 Though the contractor had a right
of action for breach against the subcontractor as soon as the accident
occurred, 137 recovery on that action could have taken years and might
have cost a great deal in litigation expenses. By that time, any judgment
the contractor might receive might be uncollectible.
The injured party's performance risk results from its uncertainty about
whether the other party's future performance will be completed as re-
quired by the contract. An example of performance risk is evident in
K & G Construction. After the subcontractor drove its bulldozer too
close to the building, 131 the contractor could reasonably conclude that
the accident had demonstrated that the subcontractor had a propensity
for further equipment mishaps. The question of the subcontractor's abil-
ity to complete the job successfully raised by the accident increases the
contractor's risk of future deficient performance. The degree of the con-
tractor's performance risk depends on what the subcontractor's remain-
ing duties are.139 If the remainder of the project involved no work near
other buildings, the contractor's increased performance risk probably
would be minimal. If the rest of the work were in close proximity to
other buildings, the contractor's performance risk could be substantially
increased.' 40
134. K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960). For the facts of K & G
Construction, see supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
135. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1100.
136. See K & G Constr., 164 A.2d at 453.
137. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 236 cmt. a (1979).
138. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
139. The contractor's insecurity may also be mitigated if it has the right to demand
assurance of performance from the subcontractor. See Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 251 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-609 (1990). Though the Second Restatement allows an
insecure party to demand assurances, the extent to which this right is applied by the
courts is unclear. See 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.23, at 491.
140. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1100.
Another case in which the performance risk is illustrated is Bart Arconti & Sons Inc. v.
Ames-Ennis, Inc, 340 A.2d 225 (Md. 1975), which is described supra at notes 97-101 and
accompanying text. In that case, a contractor withheld payment after a subcontractor
had repeatedly delayed its performance. These delays were exacerbated when the sub-
contractor's workers walked offthe job in a strike, an action which was not itself a breach
of contract. Nonetheless, in that situation there was a great risk that the contractor
would never receive its contracted performance, particularly since it was facing a tight
deadline in completing the overall project. See Bart Arconti, 340 A.2d at 229.
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b. Breaching Party
A breaching party also experiences significant situational risk. Even
without considering the possibility of the injured party's withholding
payment, the breaching party will be uncertain whether the injured party
will claim a material breach and cancel the contract. If the breach is in
fact material, this could discharge the injured party's duty to pay com-
pensation under the terms of the contract."'4 Even if the breach were not
material, the cancellation would extinguish the breaching party's confi-
dence in being able to perform as planned.'42 For example, the subcon-
tractor in K & G Construction faced increased risk when it breached the
contract. The subcontractor's compensation risk was increased because
the contractor might not have been required to pay the full contract price
in light of the breach. The subcontractor's performance risk also was





When an injured party is considering withholding payment, it faces the
risk that it will be unable to determine the legal consequences of its deci-
sion.'" This risk, the legal risk, results from two factors. The injured
party may be unsure what legal rule a court will apply in determining
whether its decision to withhold is proper. The injured party may also be
unsure how a court will apply the rule selected, given the facts of its case.
141. When a contracting party materially breaches a contract, it has not substantially
performed, and therefore has not fulfilled a constructive condition to the injured party's
performance. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. Since this condition has not
occurred, the breaching party is not entitled to compensation pursuant to the contract.
In some jurisdictions, however, the breaching party may be entitled to a quasi-contractual
recovery for the work performed. See Mills v. Denny Weikhorst Excavating, Inc., 293
N.W.2d 112 (Neb. 1980); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. a (1979); see also
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-22, at 477 (describing this view as the "modern
trend"); see generally id. § 11-22 (describing the conflict in the law in this issue); Robert
J. Nordstrom & Irwin F. Woodland, Recovery by Building Contractor in Default, 20 Ohio
St. L.J. 193, 198-204 (1959) (same). Other jurisdictions do not allow for quasi-contrac-
tual recovery after a material breach. See, e.g., Russo v. Charles I. Hosmer, Inc., 44
N.E.2d 641, 643 (Mass. 1942) (holding that a contractor that did not substantially per-
form under the contract was not entitled to quantum meruit recovery).
142. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1097.
If the breach were not material the cancellation would be wrongful, but it still would
operate as a repudiation of the contract. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 12-2.
The canceling party would be liable in damages to the other party for its wrongful cancel-
lation, but the other party would still be unable to complete its contracted performance.
See id. § 12-3.
143. The breaching party's uncertainty may be increased even further when the injured
party's response to the breach is neither a clear cancellation nor a clear waiver of the
breach, but an equivocal statement in between. See Arthur Rosett, Partial, Qualified, and
Equivocal Repudiation of Contract, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 93, 93-95 (1981).
144. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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These two elements of a party's legal risk may be referred to as its rule
determination risk and its fact application risk.
The injured party's rule determination risk results from its uncertainty
as to what legal standard a court will apply in considering the propriety
of a decision to withhold payment. Contracting parties are frequently
uncertain as to what legal rule a court will determine to be applicable to
them.14 For example, when the contractor in K & G Construction de-
cided to withhold, there apparently had been no common-law standard
for withholding established in its state. 1I Because of the number of stan-
dards which are applied to the question of withholding, and the way in
which courts apply these standards, this risk is particularly acute for
withholding decisions. 47
The injured party's fact application risk results from its uncertainty as
to how, given a particular legal standard, a court will construe its actions
given the facts of its case. 48 This type of risk is also illustrated in K & G
Construction, where, even if the contractor had been sure that the court
145. See Seita, supra note 123, at 109-11.
146. The case was one of first impression in Maryland's Court of Appeals, that state's
highest court. In the relevant part of its decision, the court cites no Maryland authorities
when it determined that the withholding after material breach standard applies. See K &
G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. 1960).
Even if a standard had been determined under that state's law, a court still could apply
a different standard in a later case. For instance, when the Maryland Court of Appeals
decided K & G Construction, it applied a withholding after material breach standard.
Fifteen years later, the same court decided Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc v. Ames-Ennis, Inc.,
340 A.2d 225, 233 (Md. 1975), which applied a justified standard. The court in Bart
Arconti cited K & G Construction as the basis for its decision, but nonetheless applied a
different standard than was applied in that case. See idi at 232.
Sometimes, courts will decide questions of withholding without reference to some of
the state's prior decisions on this issue. For example, Texas has two different lines of
cases which address the issue of withholding. In Morgan v. Singley, 560 S.W.2d 746, 748-
49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, an intermediate appellate
court, applied a justified standard to the question of withholding, citing the Maryland
case K & G Construction, which applied a withholding after material breach standard. In
a later case which did not involve the withholding of payment, but rather a covenant not
to compete, Hanks v. GAB Business Services; Inc., 644 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. 1982), the Texas
Supreme Court found that the standard in Morgan was inapplicable to the case's facts,
and applied an election standard for the withholding of the injured party's contractual
performance. See ia at 708. Subsequently, Texas intermediate appellate courts have ap-
plied both Morgan's justified standard and Hanks' election standard to cases involving
withholding of payment. Compare Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecom. &
Info. Sys., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 386, 391 (rex. Ct. App. 1990) (following Morgan); Hampton
v. Minton, 785 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. CL App. 1990) (same) and Shafer Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(same) with C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Leavell Co., 676 S.W.2d 693, 701 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(applying election standard from Hanks) and Cox, Colton, Stoner, Starr and Co. v.
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 672 S.W.2d 282, 286-87 (Tex. CL App. 1984) (same) and
Greenstein v. Simpson, 660 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
147. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
148. Fact application risk also results when a court will determine the propriety of a
party's decision based on information that comes to light after the party makes the deci-
sion. An example of this element of risk may be seen in the difficulties involved in deter-
mining the proper amount of withholding in Howard S. Lease Construction Co. & Assocs
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were going to apply the withholding after material breach standard, it
might have been unsure whether the subcontractor's breach would be
considered material. If the facts indicated that the breach were material,
the contractor would be allowed to withhold; if the breach were not ma-
terial, the contractor could not withhold. In K & G Construction, the
court found the breach to be material solely on the basis of the fact that
the damages caused were more than double the amount of the progress
payment. 149 However, the court could have used a wide range of other
factors to determine whether the breach were material.' 50
b. Breaching Party
A breaching party faces a similar legal risk when it must respond to
withholding by an injured party. Like the injured party, the breaching
party is subject to uncertainty as to which legal rule a court will apply to
determine whether withholding is appropriate. Similarly, the breaching
v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1986), a case between a contractor and a grading subcon-
tractor, described in detail at note 101, supra.
In Howard S. Lease, the court calculated the proper amount to withhold, using all of
the information the court had at the time of the decision, including information that was
unavailable at the time the injured contractor made its withholding decision. See Howard
S. Lease, 725 P.2d at 716. An examination of the numbers used in this case shows how
much fact application risk this calculation places on a withholding party. See id.
In the case, the contractor "backcharged" the subcontractor $52,844.89 for work that
was contractually the responsibility of the subcontractor but performed by the contrac-
tor. See id. at 714. The contractor withheld a $35,000.00 progress payment in partial
satisfaction of this backcharge, although it eventually paid the subcontractor $10,000.00
of the progress payment. See id. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Alaska
made a calculation of the amount that the contractor was entitled to withhold from the
progress payment under a combination withholding after material breach and justified
standard. See supra note 101.
When the trial court made its calculation, it allowed $44,440.69 of the $52,844.89 as
the proper amount of the backcharge. See Howard S. Lease, 725 P.2d at 714-15. The
trial court allowed counterclaims for other work the subcontractor performed which was
not billed until after the withholding, and came up with a net judgment of $26,243.20.
See id. at 714-16. This net judgment was then reduced upon reconsideration to
$18,955.05. See id. at 715. The trial court held that withholding was not allowed and the
contractor was liable for this net judgment. See id.
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Alaska took a different view of the
numbers. It took the $26,342.00 of counterclaims allowed by the trial court and added
that to the $35,000.00 withheld to determine what the total payment to the subcontractor
should have been, before withholding, $61,342.00. See id. at 716. The court then re-
duced that amount by the 10% that the contract provided would be retained until com-
pletion of the project, leaving $55,207.80. See id. From that amount, the court
determined the excess withholding by deducting the $10,000.00 which was paid to the
subcontractor after the withholding and the $44,440.69 which the trial court found to be
the appropriate amount to withhold. See id. The net excess withholding was found to be
$767.11. See id. The court found that this amount was so insignificant as to not be the
cause of the subcontractor's damages. See id. If the court had used any of the other
calculations, however, the case might have been resolved very differently.
149. See K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. 1960).
150. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 459-60; Andersen, supra note
24, at 1131-32.
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party may not know how a court will interpret the facts of its situation
under the rule.
B. Allocation of Risk by Withholding
When a contracting party is in a situation of uncertainty, it will often
try to mitigate the risk that it faces. One method of reducing risk is to
withhold payment due to the breaching party. As previously noted, an
injured party faces uncertainty as to whether it will be compensated for
the breach and whether the breaching party will properly complete the
remainder of its contractual performance.15 The injured party may de-
cide to respond to the breach by withholding. If it does so, it may reduce
some of the elements of risk that it faces. However, by doing so it may
increase other elements of its risk and change the risks faced by the
breaching party. When a party withholds, it changes the way that the
uncertainty is allocated, both among the elements of its own risk and
between itself and the breaching party.
When an injured party withholds, it reduces its compensation risk. By
immediately retaining money, it may reduce its uncertainty that it will
not get that money after a future determination of the damages from the
breach. Withholding contemporaneously compensates the injured party
for a deficiency in the breaching party's performance.1 52
The reduction in compensation risk is not without cost, however.
When an injured party withholds, it faces significant uncertainty as to the
legal consequences of its action.1 53 This uncertainty may subject it to the
costs and risks of future litigation over the propriety of its withholding.
In addition, when an injured party withholds, it may face an increase in
its performance risks. This increased performance risk results from un-
certainty as to whether the breaching party will continue to perform in
light of the injured party's withholding. 154
By withholding, the injured party may cause the breaching party to
face increased uncertainty about its own compensation. 55 When pay-
ment is withheld, the breaching party may be unsure whether it will be
paid the excess of the contract price over the amount of the damages
resulting from the breach."5 6 Furthermore, the breaching party may dis-
151. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
152. Cf supra note 133 (discussing interest in present performance impaired by
breach).
153. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
154. Cf supra note 133 (discussing interest in likelihood of future performance).
The breaching party may cease performance as a result of its own independent deci-
sion. However, it may also have difficulty in continuing its performance because it does
not have use of the withheld funds, which may cause it to be unable to pay its suppliers.
See 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 692, at 269-70.
155. Cf supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing compensation and per-
formance risks of breaching parties without considering withholding).
156. A contracting party obviously would be reluctant to continue contractual per-
formance for which it will never be paid. If the damages exceed the remaining contract
price, however, a breaching party will still be benefitted by completing the contract, be-
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pute the amount the injured party is withholding.'57
The breaching party may mitigate its compensation risk by stopping
performance and canceling the contract. This would eliminate the
breaching party's risk that it would do future work for which it would
not be compensated. However, this also forecloses any interest the
breaching party has in the opportunity to complete the work. 58
In addition to changing the compensation risk, a breaching party's
cancellation in response to withholding may subject it to significant legal
risk. The breaching party may be unsure which legal standard a court
would use to determine whether the injured party's withholding is
proper. Further, the injured party may be uncertain how a court would
apply the facts of the case to the applicable standard.' 59 If the breaching
party cancels the contract when it is not entitled to do so, it may give the
injured party the right to claim further damages."
C. Parties' Reactions to Risk
Because of the risks involved, many contracting parties insert provi-
sions into their contracts which seek to protect them by delineating the
situations in which withholding is appropriate. For example, it is
common to encounter clauses allowing partial retainage 16' until satisfac-
tory completion of the contract,162 arbitration clauses,1 63 backcharge
clauses," 64 and clauses allowing withholding in specific situations. 6 5
In the construction industry, contract provisions addressing withhold-
ing are common. The American Institute of Architects has produced a
series of contract documents that are used widely in the industry. 166 Its
standard construction agreement between owner and contractor provides
cause the contractual value of its performance will be deducted from the amount of dam-
ages it will be required to pay. Further, the breaching party will not have to pay the
increased costs which may be incurred by the injured party by hiring someone else to
complete the contract.
157. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1122.
158. Cf supra note 133 (discussing interest in likelihood of future performance).
159. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
160. See 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.15, at 436.
161. "Retainage" is a construction industry term describing the percentage of the pro-
gress payments due to the contractor retained by the owner to be paid at the completion
of the contract. See Stewart v. C & C Excavating & Constr. Co., 877 F.2d 711, 713 (8th
Cir. 1989).
162. See, e.g., id. (clause allowing 10% retainage); K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164
A.2d 451, 452 (Md. 1960) (same).
163. See, e.g., Oak Ridge Constr. Co. v. Tolley, 504 A.2d 1343, 1346 n.3 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985) (clause requiring arbitration of payment disputes).
164. See, e.g., Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 340 A.2d 225, 228 (Md.
1975) (clause requiring subcontractor to reimburse contractor for backcharges).
165. See, e.g., In re Nemko, Inc., 143 B.R. 980, 984 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (clauses
allowing withholding if subcontractors are not paid or claims are made against owner).
In some situations, parties may wish to disallow withholding. See, e.g., Heinhold
Holdings, Inc. v. Geldermann, Inc., No. 89 C 1870, 1991 WL 14068, at *3 (N.D. I11. Feb
1, 1991) ("no set-off" provision disallowing withholding).
166. See Justin Sweet, Sweet on Construction Industry Contracts at v. (1987). The
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that the contractor is to submit pay requests to the architect on the pro-
ject. 67 The architect then issues a certificate of payment for the amount
it determines is due, withholding certification for the amount it feels is
not due. 168 The owner is then required to pay the contractor the amount
that the architect has determined. 169 If the architect and owner do not
promptly fulfill their duties of certifying and making payment, the con-
tractor may, on seven days written notice, suspend its performance until
paid.'70 Though this contract provision is effective in major construction
projects where there is an independent, professional architect who is
available to scrutinize each pay request, a similar provision would not be
effective for contracts in which there is no similar independent adjudica-
tor available to decide each payment question.
In the absence of a contractual provision dealing with withholding,
uncertainty as to the legal consequences of their actions often causes par-
ties to act in ways that do not reflect the optimum minimization of their
compensation and performance risks. 17  For instance, in K & G Con-
struction,172 if the subcontractor had admitted liability for the damages
from the bulldozer accident, and was unlikely to damage any other build-
ings, withholding of payment by the contractor would have minimized
the contractor's risks. By withholding, the contractor would have imme-
diately secured its compensation from the breach, avoiding the risk of the
subcontractor's subsequent insolvency. Further, the contractor would
have faced a low risk of the subcontractor ceasing its performance, since
the subcontractor's interest would be to continue its performance, avoid
damages from the contractor's cost of replacement, and receive the re-
mainder of the payment when the breach damages were worked off.
Even under these circumstances, where the situational risks strongly
favor withholding, the contractor may nevertheless refrain from with-
American Institute of Architects construction contracts are approved and endorsed by
the Associated General Contractors, a construction industry trade association. See id.
167. See American Inst. of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construc-
tion (Doc. No. A201), art. 9, § 9.3.1 (1987) [hereinafter General Conditions], reprinted in
3 American Inst. of Architects, Architect's Handbook of Professional Practice (1 Ith ed.
1988) [hereinafter Architect's Handbook]. The General Conditions document is a state-
ment of terms which is incorporated by reference into the American Institute of Archi-
tect's standard construction agreement. See American Inst. of Architects, Standard
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor (Doc. No. A101), at 1 (1987), re-
printed in 3 Architect's Handbook, supra.
168. See General Conditions, supra note 167, §§ 9.4, 9.5. The architect may withhold
certification in the event the owner is damaged. See id. § 9.5.1.5.
169. See id. § 9.6.1.
170. See id § 9.7. When this happens, the contractor is allowed the reasonable costs of
shut down, delay, and start-up. See id.
171. Cf Seita, supra note 123, at 103-12 (arguing that legal risk encourages inefficient
contract decisions).
172. K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960). In K & G Construction
the contract at issue had a 10% retainage clause. See id. at 452. The amount of damages
was, however, far in excess of the retainage amount, so this clause had no effect on the
withholding issues.
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holding because of uncertainty as to how a court would construe the
withholding.
D. Analysis of Withholding Standards
Each of the withholding standards previously discussed'73 allocates
risk to the parties in different ways by allowing the parties to minimize
some risks at the expense of increasing others. By analyzing the way
each of these standards deals with the uncertainties of withholding, their
costs and benefits may be compared. 174
1. Withholding After Material Breach
Although the withholding after material breach standard sometimes
allows withholding when it is warranted by the risks of the situation, the
standard's use of the material breach doctrine occasionally prevents
withholding in situations where it would be warranted. This standard
provides that after the conduct of one of the parties rises to the level of a
material breach, all future breaches are excused. 75 Under this standard,
material breach is the dividing line between allowing and prohibiting
withholding.
The withholding after material breach standard takes material breach,
a doctrine applied to ascertain the fairness of cancellation, 76 and applies
173. See supra part I.C-D.
174. Since this section deals specifically with each of the standards as they are applied,
it does not examine the rule determination risk involved when parties are faced with the
possibility of more than one of the standards being applied.
175. See supra notes 56-74. The principles involved in the withholding after material
breach standard, as well as those involved in the other withholding standards, may be
illustrated by reference to the well-known children's game "Mommy, he hit me-But, she
hit me first" played in automobile back seats across the country. In this game, a brother
and sister on a long car trip will annoy each other in a gradually escalating pattern. The
brother will make a face at his sister. In response, she will poke him. He will poke her
back, whereupon she'll pinch him. He'll kick her; she'll kick him; he'll kick her back
harder; and so on.
This game will go on until one of the siblings, in this example the sister, cries out,
"Mommy, he hit me." The brother will respond, "But she hit me first." The sister then
will retort, "But he kicked me." The brother will explain that she kicked him first, and so
on.
In the contractual withholding context, "Mommy" is the court, which must decide
which party was in the wrong. Under the withholding after material breach standard,
Mommy must decide which party's conduct was the first to cross the line into a material
breach of back seat etiquette. Mommy might decide that it is fine to make faces, a little
back seat poking and pinching is to be expected, but when the kicking starts, that's it.
She would then punish the first offender who kicked his or her sibling. The other sibling's
actions would be considered excused because they occurred after a material breach.
176. See 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.16, at 442; Andersen, supra note 24, at 1139-
40. It is impossible to come up with a simple test to determine whether a breach is
material. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 cmt. a (1979); Restatement of
Contracts § 275 cmt. a (1932); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18, at 459-60.
Both Restatements list circumstances to be considered in determining whether a breach is
material. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1979); Restatement of Contracts
§ 275 (1932). They each acknowledge, however, that the purpose of the determination is
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it to determine the fairness of withholding while demanding continuing
performance. Since the doctrine of material breach was developed to de-
termine the fairness of canceling a contract, rather than the fairness of
withholding in a continuing contract, the withholding after material
breach standard balances the withholding decision on a point which has
little relevance to risks of withholding. This discrepancy results in with-
holding being denied in some cases where it would most effectively re-
duce the risks that the parties face. 177
Furthermore, the withholding after material breach standard provides
no protection to the breaching party. When the breaching party commits
a material breach, all of the injured party's obligations to perform under
the contract are discharged. 178 Under this standard, the injured party
may evade all of its own performance while insisting on full performance
by the breaching party. 17 9
Moreover, under this standard, the insufficient protection given to the
breaching party causes the injured party considerable performance risk.
The injured party is allowed to withhold all payments when the breach-
ing party commits a material breach, thereby reducing the risk that the
injured party will not be compensated for the breach. However, by al-
lowing the withholding of all payment upon a material breach, while still
requiring the breaching party to complete performance, the breaching
party is exposed to a risk of never being compensated for its perform-
anceso Since the breaching party, having committed a material breach,
to answer the question of "when does a failure to perform a promise discharge the duty to
perform the return promise for an agreed exchange." Restatement of Contracts § 275
cmt. a (1932); accord Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 cmt. a (1979) (standard of
materiality applied "to further the purpose of securing for each party his expectation of
an exchange of performances.").
177. For example, Corbin notes that "[a] builder's nonperformance of a part of the
contract may also be so injurious to the owner as to justify him in renouncing the con-
tract wholly, stopping performance, and suing for damages as for a total breach. But
many such a nonperformance will justify withholding payment without justifying renun-
ciation." 3A Corbin, supra note 19, § 692, at 273.
178. It is a condition of each party's duty to perform under a contract that the other
party commit no material breach of a duty due at an earlier time. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 237. When such a condition fails, it prevents the injured party's
performance from coming due. See id cmt. a.
179. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. b (1979). Though the with-
holding after material breach standard described in this Note allows unfettered withhold-
ing after a material breach, the cases applying the standard have not necessarily gone this
far. None of the cases that have allowed withholding under the standard have upheld
withholding an amount grossly out of proportion to the injury from the breach. See, e.g.,
K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. 1960) (approving withholding of
$1,494.50 progress payment for $3,500.00 damages); Southeastern Drywall, Inc. v. Year-
gin Constr. Co., 214 S.E.2d 303, 306-07 (N.C. 1975) (remanding for consideration of
whether withholding of $1,054.62 of total debt of S8,818.23 was material). If an injured
party were to withhold an excessive amount, courts might fashion an exception to the
material breach standard.
180. The breaching party would have the right to sue the withholding party for the
withheld payment, but this right subjects the breaching party to all of the risks, costs, and
delays of litigation.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
has abrogated its right to payment under the contract, it has little incen-
tive to continue performance. 181 This increases the injured party's risk
that the breaching party will not complete performance under the
contract.
When the original breach is non-material, the parties face a smaller
amount of risk. When the breach is non-material, the injured party may
withhold payment as long as the amount is small enough that the with-
holding itself will not be considered a material breach. 82 Each party is
uncertain whether it will eventually be compensated fully for its perform-
ance or damages. This risk is somewhat mitigated, however, as the
amount of money withheld is limited to amounts that are small enough
to be considered merely non-material breaches.
Beyond the situational risks engendered by this standard, a party will
often be uncertain about whether a court would find a breach to be mate-
rial. 83 The withholding after material breach standard depends on a de-
termination of whether a party has committed a material breach. The
risk of incorrectly determining the materiality of the breach falls squarely
on the shoulders of the party taking action, whether that action is with-
holding or canceling in response to withholding.18 4 In many circum-
stances, it is difficult to ascertain whether particular conduct constitutes
a material breach.8 5 Courts have been accused of determining the mate-
riality of breach without any coherence, rationality, or justification.8 6
Parties taking action under this standard face a substantial risk that their
own estimation of the materiality of the breach, given the facts of the
case, will be found to be incorrect in later litigation.8 7
181. In some states the breaching party may be able to recover the value of its perform-
ance, reduced by any damages resulting from the breach, under a quasi-contractual rem-
edy. In some states, however, no recovery is available after a party commits a material
breach. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
The breaching party may have some incentive to continue, because if it completes the
remainder of the performance under the contract, it avoids liability for the costs the in-
jured party may incur in arranging for substitute performance. See 2 Farnsworth, supra
note 12, § 8.15, at 438.
182. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
183. See Rosett, supra note 124, at 1087-93.
184. See 2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.15, at 435-36; cf Howard S. Lease Constr.
Co. & Assocs. v. Holly, 725 P.2d 712, 716 (Alaska 1986) (under combination withholding
after material breach and justified standard, "contractor runs the risk of guessing wrong
as to whether the subcontractor has not substantially performed"); supra note 148 (dis-
cussing magnitude of risk).
185. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 & cmt. a (1979); Restatement of
Contracts § 275 & cmt. a (1932); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-18(a), at 459-61;
2 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 8.16; Andersen, supra note 24, at 1074-76, 1081-92.
186. See Andersen, supra note 24, at 1089-92.
187. The good faith variation, described supra, notes 75-82 and accompanying text, is
an improvement over the withholding after material breach standard in those few cases in
which withholding is based on a difference in contract interpretation. Under the good
faith variation, a breaching party who is subjected to withholding based on a good faith
difference in contract interpretation by the injured party has a reduced risk that it will not
be compensated. Presumably, the withholding party will return the proper compensa-
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2. Withholding when Justified
Although the withholding when justified standard represents an at-
tempt by the courts to allow withholding where a party would be reason-
ably expected to do so, it leaves contracting parties with no direction as
to how they should conduct themselves.""' This standard recognizes the
useful nature of withholding and brings it outside of the restrictive limi-
tations of material breach.18 9 However, leaving the justification decision
entirely up to the finder of fact provides no guidance for parties that want
a standard upon which they can base their withholding decisions. Fur-
thermore, this standard may subject the parties to arbitrary and capri-
cious jury decisions, decisions which are not subject to effective review
upon appeal. 90
The justified standard allows the finder of fact the opportunity to ex-
amine the situation that the withholding party was in, and determine
whether its response was appropriate, given the risks with which it was
faced. However, though the finder of fact has the opportunity to con-
sider the risks of the situation, this standard does not require the finder of
fact actually to consider those risks, because the finder of fact has uncon-
trolled discretion as to what it may consider when coming to its decision.
Under this standard, a party has no means to determine whether an
action it takes will subsequently be found unjustified. The party has no
way to reduce its fact application risk, the risk that the finder of fact will
disagree with it as to whether it was justified in withholding.
tion when and if its contract interpretation is proven incorrect. This should reduce the
incentive to terminate and the risk of non-performance. In addition, this standard
reduces the withholding party's risk of an incorrect determination of its legal status when
it withholds in a good faith dispute over contract interpretation.
188. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text. The withholding when justified
standard may also be explained in terms of the children's game "Mommy, he hit me."
See supra note 175. Under this standard, Mommy, the court, would decide whether each
sibling's previous conduct justified the other's conduct. Mommy might decide that the
sister, having been hit, was justified in hitting back. Further, the brother, having been
kicked, was justified in hitting in the first place. This would go on until Mommy found
the first time a response was out of line with the previous chain, perhaps when the sister
poked her brother just because he made a face.
189. This standard may provide some protection for the breaching party, unlike the
withholding after material breach standard. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying
text. Under the withholding when justified standard, a withholding which exceeds the
amount reasonably required to protect the interests of the injured party might be found to
be unjustified. There appears to be no case law on this issue, however.
190. Under this standard, an appellate court examining the finder of fact's determina-
tion on whether withholding was justified may set aside the verdict only when it meets
the strict standard applied to appellate review of factual determinations. For instance, in
Texas, an appellate court must "consider only that evidence and the reasonable inference
therefrom which viewed in its most favorable light support[s] the jury finding and [it]
must reject all evidence or reasonable inferences to the contrary." Shafer Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Upon
consideration of the evidence, the appellate court "'should set aside the verdict only if it
is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
unjust.'" IL (quoting Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)).
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3. Election Required
The election standard forces a contracting party injured by a breach to
choose between two often unattractive alternatives: it may completely
cancel all of the performance under the contract and sue for total breach;
or it may fully complete its own performance, require the breaching
party to finish its performance, and sue for non-material breach. 191 The
injured party may not withhold and require the breaching party to con-
tinue performance. Neither of these two recognized alternatives ac-
knowledges the benefits of withholding in appropriate situations.192
Because the election standard denies an injured party the right to with-
hold, the party is unable to minimize its risk of incomplete compensation
without totally abrogating its performance rights. The injured party
must choose between the alternatives of cancellation and full perform-
ance, each of which protects only a portion of the party's interests. If the
injured party cancels, it reduces its compensation risks, but does so at the
expense of totally eliminating each party's interest in the future perform-
ance of the contract.' 9 If the injured party instead continues its full
performance while suing for non-material breach, it does not suffer any
additional risk of deficient performance, but it also does not improve its
interest in compensation for present injuries. 19a
Under this standard, parties that do not elect to cancel avoid the sig-
nificant legal risks inherent in cancellation. By refraining from cancella-
tion, they are treating the breach as non-material, a position which
generally subjects them to few legal uncertainties. 95 Conversely, parties
that cancel the contract face the often substantial risk in determining
whether a material breach has occurred.' 96
In sum, though this standard reduces some of the uncertainties pro-
191. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text. The election standard may also be
explained in terms of the game "Mommy, he hit me." See supra note 175. In this varia-
tion-which, I, as the older brother of a little sister, know well-the brother is not al-
lowed to hit the sister back. (Perhaps a few immaterial breaches, like a poke or pinch,
here or there, would not be punished, but he can't really hit her.) In this case, the sister is
allowed to annoy the brother, kicking or hitting him as long as she wants, until he gets
thoroughly fed up and hits her. When the sister cries out, "Mommy, he hit me,"
Mommy, the court, may respond one of two ways. She may either say to the brother,
"You know you shouldn't hit your sister," or say to the sister, "I saw what was happen-
ing; you've been bugging your brother for the last ten minutes; you deserved it."
192. One way that a party may partially get around the election standard's disallow-
ance of withholding is to wait until performance is completed, then retain the last pay-
ment. This retention of the last payment is, however, outside of this Note's definition of
withholding, which requires that there be both payments and performance remaining.
See supra part I.B.
193. See supra note 133.
194. See supra note 133.
195. A party is always allowed to take no action in response to a breach, electing to
treat it as non-material. However, if the breach is deemed to be a repudiation and the
party does not react, the avoidable consequences rule may bar the injured party from
recovering some damages that it could have mitigated. See Rosett, supra note 143, at 94.
196. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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duced by withholding, it does not take into consideration the many situa-
tions where withholding represents a valuable compromise between
cancellation and a suit for damages.
4. Uniform Commercial Code
In contracts for the sale of goods, section 2-717 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code grants the buyer an unencumbered right to withhold 197-a
right which is justified by the reduced risk and additional protection
present under the UCC.
The uncertainties in the sale of goods context are somewhat different
from those that arise under common-law contracts. The risk of inade-
quate compensation is often lower in contracts for the sale of goods. It is
frequently easier to value tangible goods in the market, and therefore
assess the damages resulting from a breach, than it is to value services or
intangibles.198 Moreover, the types of remedies available to the buyer are
expressly delineated in the Code.199 The risk of incomplete performance
is often lower because the injured party may be able to purchase substi-
tute goods.'o Furthermore, the notice requirement protects the breach-
ing seller from risk by reducing its uncertainty about the buyer's
intentions." In addition, the UCC expressly provides that if a party is
197. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
198. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1990).
199. Section 2-714 sets forth the buyer's damages for accepted goods. It provides that
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3)
of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any nonconformity of tender
the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as
determined in any manner which is reasonable.(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount.(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next
section may also be recovered.
U.C.C. § 2-714 (1990). Section 2-715 allows for incidental and consequential damages.
It provides that
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses rea-
sonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable ex-
pense incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715 (1990). Other sections cover the buyer's remedies when the seller repudi-
ates or the buyer rejects the goods, see U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to 2-713 (1990), and the buyer's
right to specific performance or replevin, see U.C.C. § 2-716 (1990).
200. See U.C.C. 2-712 (1990).
201. The notice requirement serves to give the parties an opportunity to resolve their
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insecure about the performance of the other party, the insecure party
may demand assurances of due performance.20 2
The risk that the parties face under the UCC is enhanced, however, by
the unavailability of cancellation. Goods that do not conform to the con-
tract specifications of the buyer may be accepted by the buyer,2 a and the
acceptance of these goods may occur even when the buyer does not know
of their non-conformity or defects.2" Goods that are accepted must be
paid for,2"5 and acceptance can only be revoked in limited circum-
stances.20 6 The risk of loss caused by the unavailability of cancellation is
offset however, by the buyer's right to make good faith withholding of
payment upon breach.20 7
The uncertainties relating to how a court will view withholding under
this section of the UCC are minimal. Every state except Louisiana has
adopted section 2-717,208 providing a uniformity in the standard that is
applied. Only a small proportion of cases involving withholding for
goods would implicate the three questions of interpretation which courts
have addressed: the existence of a breach, whether the breach was of the
same contract, and whether notice was given in a timely manner.20 9
Aside from the uncertainty engendered in these few questions, there is
little uncertainty in the legal application of this section, as courts have
consistently applied this section in the manner in which it is written.210
The Uniform Commercial Code section 2-717 withholding standard is
a good solution within the limited context in which it operates-the sale
of goods-though it would provide insufficient protection to the parties if
it were applied in the broader context of common-law contracts. Even
difference through negotiation and settlement. See U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1990); see also
supra note 122 (examining courts' interpretations of U.C.C. § 2-717's notice require-
ment); see generally Rosett, supra note 124 (advocating duty of communication between
contracting parties).
202. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1990).
203. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990).
204. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 2-606(1) (1990); See also Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg &
Beck Div., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1085-87 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding that buyer had ac-
cepted non-conforming goods even though buyer did not know of defects in the goods),
aff'd, 762 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1985).
205. See U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (1990).
206. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1990).
207. In addition, a party that is injured by a breach of a installment contract may be
entitled to cancel the remaining installments of the contract. Section 2-612 of the Code
covers installment contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-612(l) (1990). It provides that it is a breach
of the whole contract when "non-conformity or default with respect to one or more in-
stallments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract." See U.C.C. § 2-612(3)
(1990).
208. See Uniform Commercial Code, Table of Jurisdictions Wherin Code has been
Adopted, I U.L.A. 1, 1-2 (Supp. 1993).
209. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
210. See Carbontek Trading Co. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., 910 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.
1990); Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1985); Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp.,
537 F. Supp. 77, 86 (N.D. Ili. 1982).
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though it is fair to allow the buyer of goods to withhold, considering the
protections that Article 2 of the UCC provides, generally allowing in-
jured parties to withhold for all common-law contracts would be unfair
without providing the breaching parties additional protection. Nonethe-
less, some of the ideas contained in this code section would be useful if
they were carried over into general contract law.2"
III. PROPOSED STANDARD
A. Requirements for an Improved Standard
This section examines the requirements for an improved withholding
standard that may be applied to general common-law contracts to deter-
mine the propriety of a party's withholding of payment upon another
party's breach of a contractual obligation. All of the standards now ap-
plied by the courts fail to meet the needs of contracting parties. None of
them succeed at meeting the challenge of effectively minimizing the risks
faced by both the injured and the breaching parties.
An improved standard for withholding would minimize the risks faced
by the parties. It would allow the injured party to withhold damages
resulting from a breach of contract, reducing the risk of not being com-
pensated for the breach. It would also encourage the breaching party to
continue to fulfill its contractual obligations, minimizing the risk of in-
complete performance. The standard would, however, need to provide
protection for the breaching party, so that the reduction of risk to the
injured party is not at the expense of significantly increased risk to the
breaching party.21 2 Further, the improved standard must discourage
withholding that is made in bad faith or for an improper purpose.21 3
211. For example, a requirement of notice may be beneficial in a common-law with-
holding standard. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text; cf. Murray, supra note
117 (discussing general applicability of the Code to common-law contracts).
212. This proposed standard attempts to minimize the risks faced by both of the par-
ties. It attempts to avoid mitigating the risks of one party at the expense of dispropor-
tionately increasing the risks of the other.
Other standards allocate the risk differently. For instance, the election standard places
a significant portion of the risk on the injured party. Under that standard, the injured
party must choose between full performance, which allows no reduction of the compensa-
tion risk, and cancellation, which allows no reduction of the performance risk. See supra
part II.D.3.
Under a law and economics analysis, the risk might be allocated according to the par-
ties' relative aversions to risk. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and
Economics 119 (1983). However, under a standard of general applicability, the relative
risk aversions of the parties will not be known.
Under a punitive standard, the majority of the risk should be allocated to the breaching
party, as the one who caused the damages in the first place. However, this does not take
into account that breaches often occur through no willful action of the breaching party.
Further, this does not take into account the interest each of the parties may have in
having a fair contract law system which encourages parties to cooperate to solve their
contract problems, rather than to behave oppressively and punitively toward those who
do not complete their contractual obligations.
213. A general requirement of good faith is often imputed into the performance of
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An improved standard should also encourage the parties to resolve
their differences through communication, negotiation, and settlement
rather than through the costly, risky processes of cancellation and litiga-
tion.214 The standard should provide for each party to give the other
notice of its actions, so as to open the door for communications and re-
duce the risk of misunderstanding.215
In addition to reducing the risk inherent in the situation, an optimal
test for withholding should minimize the risk that the parties will be un-
able to identify the results of a legal determination of their situation. The
legal standard must be clearly identified and specified to reduce the un-
certainty as to the rule to be applied. This could be done through legisla-
tion or decisional law, and can be done in the case of individual contracts
through terms within the contract. In addition, the risk of incorrectly
determining the legal positions of the parties should be minimized by
clear standards that are ascertainable by the parties when they withhold
based on information that they have at that time.
An improved standard must not sacrifice fairness for legal definiteness,
however. The standard must provide enough flexibility to apply to a
wide variety of situations. It must further prevent a party from avoiding
the spirit of the rule through strict adherence to its letter. This flexibility
is provided by gauging the standard on the reasonable conduct of the
contracting parties.216
contracts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 & cmts. (1979); Calamari &
Perillo, supra note 10, § 11-38; see generally Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of
Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982) [here-
inafter Summers, General Duty] (discussing good faith in contract law); Robert S. Sum-
mers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968) (same). However, no single, adequate defi-
nition of good faith has ever been proposed. See Summers, General Duty, supra, at 829-
30. The Second Restatement, while noting that good faith varies with the context in
which it is used, does attempt to give some shape to its definition by pointing out exam-
ples of what is not good faith. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a, illus. 1-7
(1979); see also Summers, General Duty, supra, at 820-35 (describing the Restatement's
"excluder" analysis and arguing for its validity). The Second Restatement notes that bad
faith has been recognized in subterfuges, evasions, inaction, "evasion of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance,
abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the
other party's performance." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. d (1979).
214. See Rosett, supra note 124 passim (discussing benefits of communication between
contracting parties in disputes and arguing that courts should consider the communica-
tion between the parties as a factor in judging their conduct); Rosett, supra note 143
passim (encouraging communication between parties in cases of repudiation and urging
that courts take notice of that communication).
215. See Rosett, supra note 124 passim; see also U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1990) (notice
"opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation"); cf. U.C.C. § 2-609 (1990)
(allowing parties to request assurances of due performances). Notice is discussed in sev-
eral of the cases dealing with withholding. See, e.g., Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564
P.2d 30, 42-43 (Alaska 1977) (requiring notice before withholding); see also 2 Farns-
worth, supra note 12, § 8.15, at 440 n.17 (noting that withholding after material breach
standard does not require notice).
216. See 1 Farnsworth, supra note 12, § 3.28; E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Per-
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B. Proposed Standard
This section sets forth a proposed standard that may be applied to
determine when withholding should be allowed. This standard is
designed to cover a wide range of situations, minimize the risks faced by
the parties, and encourage the parties to communicate in hopes of set-
tling differences. It is intended to be applied by courts when parties have
not specified the terms of withholding within their contract.21 It may
also be enacted by a legislature as a statutory default rule.218 It is, how-
ever, phrased as a paragraph which may be included by parties within a
specific contract, since, until a standard is universally applied, parties
may wish to protect themselves by including a withholding rule within
their contracts. This standard may, in addition, be implemented by stat-
ute or judicial action with slight modification. The notes accompanying
the standard provide an analysis and explanation of how each section
operates.21 9
WITHHOLDING OF PAYMENT
In the event of a breach of this contract, a party injured by such breach
may withhold payment in compensation for such breach according to
the provisions of this paragraph: 220
1. Scope: This paragraph shall apply to the withholding of payment
under this contract where the contractual obligations of each of the
parties are not terminated. It shall not limit the rights of the parties to
cancel the contract and all remaining obligations of each party in the
event of a "material" breach of the contract, except that a canceling
party must give express notice that it is canceling the contract, and not
formance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963).
The concept of commercial reasonableness has been used extensively within the Uni-
form Commercial Code. See, eg., U.C.C. § 1-204 (1990) (defining reasonable time). Ac-
cordingly, reasonable withholding can be determined by reference to the cases which
have interpreted the Code's withholding provision. See Carbontek Trading Co. v. Phibro
Energy, Inc., 910 F.2d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 1990); Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck
Div., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1985);
Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F.Supp 77, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
217. Even though the standard is set forth as a series of detailed procedures, a court
need not insist on full performance of the details of that procedure. Substantial compli-
ance with the concepts contained within the procedure would be sufficient.
218. Legislatures are generally reluctant to interfere with the operation of common-
law contract principles. But see, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1109 (McKinney 1989)
(providing for irrevocability of written offer made without consideration). However, this
standard could be set out as a statutory safe harbor to protect a withholding party that
follows its procedures.
219. These notes, with minor modifications, may be used as an official commentary to
a statutory enactment of this standard.
220. This standard only address the right of an injured party to withhold payment in
the event of a breach. It does not cover the right of an injured party to withhold any
other measure of performance under the contract. There are many situations where the
withholding of part performance in response to a breach would be appropriate, and the
standard may be modified to take those situations into account.
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withholding under this paragraph. 22 1
2. Definitions: The "Injured Party" shall be the party which has suf-
fered damages from a breach. The "Breaching Party" shall be the
party which has committed such breach; the Breaching Party shall re-
main so designated even if the injured party has withheld in violation
of the terms of this paragraph, thereby committing a breach itself. The
"Estimate" shall be the estimate of the damages proximately caused by
the breach computed pursuant to subparagraph 3 of this paragraph.2 22
3. Estimate: Prior to withholding, the Injured Party shall make an
Estimate of the reasonable amount of damages caused by the breach of
the Breaching Party. Such Estimate shall generally be computed with
reference to the damages which would be recoverable for the breach
under applicable legal and equitable rules. However, if the breach was
of a provision that was to provide the injured party with security for
performance or against claims, the Estimate may be for the amount
such security was reduced. The Estimate shall be made using all infor-
mation reasonably available to the Injured Party at the time it is made.
The Injured Party shall not be liable for an Estimate which, based on
information that was not reasonably available to the Injured Party at
the time of the Estimate, is later determined to be unreasonable, unless
the Estimate is not updated pursuant to subparagraph 7 of this
paragraph.2 23
221. This section points out the difference between cancellation and withholding. It
provides that the standard does not interfere with the common-law right of cancellation.
This right is also known as the right of "recision" or "termination." See supra note 12.
However, any party that wants to cancel the contract must give express notice of the
cancellation. This notice will avoid situations where a party is unsure whether another
party is canceling the contract or merely withholding payment.
222. This section describes the parties using definitions which are consistent with those
used in this Note. See supra note 2. In addition, it defines the "Estimate" which is
provided for in the next section.
223. This section requires the injured party to make a reasonable estimate of its dam-
ages before withholding payment. Explicitly requiring such an estimate to be made
points out to the injured party the difference between withholding and cancellation.
Under withholding, the injured party may only withhold the amount of its damages;
under cancellation, the party may cease making all future payments. Cf Andersen, supra
note 24, at 1120-22 (arguing that retention of excess amounts after cancellation should be
prohibited).
The reasonable amount to be withheld would normally be computed with reference to
the legal damages which would be recoverable in an action on the breach. However,
when the breach is of a term of the contract which is intended to provide security for the
injured party, such as a payment bond requirement, it would be reasonable for the injured
party to withhold the amount of that reduced security. Cf. Arctic Contractors, Inc. v.
State, 564 P.2d 30, 42 (Alaska 1977) (finding withholding warranted when required pay-
ment bond fails); General Conditions, supra note 167, § 9.5.1.6 (allowing architect to re-
duce amount of payment certification when subcontractors have not been paid, thereby
allowing owner to withhold payment to contractor).
The estimate must be made considering all of the information reasonably available to
the injured party at the time of estimate, and the injured party should not be liable if
subsequent information comes to light which would indicate that the amount estimated
was incorrect. However, any subsequent information would have to be included in later
updates of the estimate of the damages, as required in subparagraph 7. Cf. supra note 148
(showing complexity of calculation of proper withholding using subsequent information).
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4. Withholding: The Injured Party may withhold up to the amount of
the Estimate from any payments due to the Breaching Party. If, at any
time, the amount due the Breaching Party exceeds the amount of the
Estimate, the Injured Party shall pay the Breaching Party the excess at
the time the payment would otherwise be due. 24
5. Notice The Injured Party shall give written notice of the withhold-
ing to the Breaching Party at the time and place which would have
been required for payment, or a reasonable time thereafter (but if this
contract has a provision that the time for payment is "of the essence,"
then notice shall be given by the express time required for payment).
Such notice shall indicate that the Injured Party is withholding pay-
ment and the reasons therefor. It shall also indicate the amount of the
Estimate of the damages which will be withheld to compensate it for
the breach and how such amount was computed.225
6. Continued Performance: The Breaching Party shall be required to
continue performance of all of its obligations under the contract unless
the withholding is of an unreasonable amount or not made in good
faith. A withholding which is unreasonable in amount or not in good
faith shall be a material breach of the contract, but the Breaching
Party must notify the withholding party of its intent not to complete
performance, and give the withholding party a reasonable opportunity
to modify the withholding, before ceasing performance and canceling
the contract. If the Breaching Party cancels after complying with the
notice requirements of this subparagraph, the Injured Party shall have
the burden of proving that its withholding was reasonable and in good
faith. If, after being notified that the Injured Party is withholding
under this paragraph, the Breaching Party cancels without giving the
notice required by this subparagraph, it shall be considered to have
materially breached the contract and any breach by the Injured Party
in improperly withholding shall be excused. 6
7. Duty to Update Estimate: The Injured Party shall have a continu-
This provision reduces the injured party's fact application risk by foreclosing judicial
determinations based on information which was not available to the party at the time of
the decision. See supra note 148.
224. This section allows the injured party to withhold up to the amount of the estimate
from payments due to the breaching party. However, it explicitly requires that amounts
due in excess of the estimate shall be paid over to the breaching party. The provisions of
this section reduce the breaching party's risk that it will not be compensated after it has
performed enough to cover the breach. Cf supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text
(describing risk of non-compensation under withholding after material breach standard).
225. This section requires that the injured party give the breaching party full notice of
the terms of the withholding at the time when payment would be required (including a
reasonable time thereafter if the contract does not provide that the time for payment is of
the essence). This reduces the performance risk of both parties because the breaching
party, knowing the terms of the withholding, is more likely complete its performance. Cf.
Rosett, supra note 143, at 94 (discussing risks to parties when unsure of terms of repudia-
tion). Further, it encourages the parties to communicate and negotiate, rather than can-
cel and litigate. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
226. This section provides that the breaching party must generally continue its per-
formance after the withholding. It provides that a proper withholding does not affect the
obligations of the breaching party. This section, however, allows a limited exception with
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ing duty to update the Estimate of the damages at reasonable intervals.
Such updates shall be based on additional information as it becomes
reasonably available to the Injured Party. If the Breaching Party
presents a written request for an adjustment of the Estimate, the In-
jured Party shall, within a reasonable time, provide a written response
to such request. In the event of cure of the breach or a reduced Esti-
mate of the damages from the breach, the Injured Party shall promptly
pay the Breaching Party the excess withheld amount.
22 7
C. Discussion of Standard
The standard outlined above provides for the good faith withholding
of an amount reasonably necessary to compensate an injured party for a
breach of contract. Each party receives notice of the actions of the other
party. The injured party must have a reasonable basis for the withhold-
ing, and such basis must be promptly communicated to the breaching
party. The breaching party may cancel the contract for an unreasonable
or bad faith withholding only after providing the withholding party with
notice and an opportunity to respond. This standard incorporates some
specific conditions that must be satisfied before the breaching party may cease its per-
formance.
This section reduces the risk to the injured party that the breaching party will not
perform. However, it provides an outlet that allows the breaching party to cancel in the
face of an unfair withholding.
The breaching party may cancel in the face of a withholding which is unreasonable in
amount or not made in good faith, but only after it has given notice that it intends to
cancel, and has allowed the injured party a reasonable time to respond. This notice prior
to cancellation serves the same purposes as the notice of withholding that is required
pursuant to subparagraph 5.
If the breaching party gives notice and cancels, the burden of proof of the reasonable-
ness and good faith of the withholding is put onto the injured party. This provides a
disincentive for an injured party to withhold when it cannot demonstrate that it has done
so reasonably and in good faith. This counterbalances the power that the injured party
has to be the judge of its own remedy.
If the breaching party cancels without giving notice, it will be thereby considered to
have materially breached the contract. The injured party will then be excused from any
breaches it may have committed in withholding. This emphasizes the importance of the
requirement that the parties communicate before cancellation.
227. This section provides that the injured party has a continuing obligation to
reevaluate the amount that it is withholding, as new information about the damages be-
comes available. Any excess that is withheld after revision of the estimate must be
promptly paid to the breaching party. This continuing obligation reduces the breaching
party's risk of not being compensated if it takes action to cure or mitigate the breach.
The injured party is only obligated to revise its estimate at reasonable intervals. What
would be considered reasonable intervals would be determined by reference to the
amount and pace of information relevant to the withholding received by the withholding
party. It would also be influenced by the duration of the contract and the intervals at
which payment was normally made.
The injured party will not be liable if it does not reduce its withholding as soon as
information suggesting reduction is received, but must merely do so within a reasonable
time thereafter. However, the breaching party may, at any time, make a written request
that the estimate be adjusted. The injured party must promptly respond to such request
in writing, or, if appropriate, pay the breaching party the requested amount.
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of the provisions of the UCC standard and makes refinements which al-
low it to apply to general contracts. If this standard is followed, it will
prevent many of the contractual disputes that would otherwise cause
agreements to become enmeshed in litigation.
The standard reduces the risks the parties face due to the uncertainties
attending their situation. The injured party is allowed to withhold an
amount sufficient to provide compensation for the damages it has in-
curred, but no more. So long as this withholding is reasonable and in
good faith, the breaching party will be required to complete its perform-
ance. The breaching party is assured that it will be compensated for the
value of the performance that it provides in excess of the damages for the
breach. Further, it has assurances that its continuing performance is de-
manded. Each party has clear notice of the actions of the other party, so
misunderstandings are reduced and negotiation and settlement is
encouraged.
Further, the standard minimizes the risk of legal uncertainties. The
uncertainty as to the governing legal formulation is reduced because the
standard provides a clear enumeration of the duties of the parties. By
proceeding in a reasonable, good faith manner,"2 and giving notice of
and the reasons for their actions, the parties can minimize the risk that
courts will interpret the facts of their case in an unexpected manner." 9
CONCLUSION
A party injured by a breach of a continuing common-law contract
faces considerable confusion in the rules governing its right to withhold
payment without jeopardizing its ability to require the breaching party to
perform fully its remaining contractual obligations. This confusion sub-
jects both parties to risks that they might not otherwise face. Until the
law becomes settled in this area, contracting parties must protect them-
228. The precise boundaries of reasonable, good faith behavior are, of course, impossi-
ble to delineate. See Summers, General Duty, supra note 213, at 820-24. Some examples
concerning withholding, however, are useful to illustrate the concept. In K & G Con-
struction Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960), it was reasonable for the contractor to
withholding a $1,484.50 progress payment after a bulldozer accident causing $3,400.00 in
damages. In M & W Masonry Construction, Inc v. Head, 562 P.2d 957 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976), it was unreasonable for a contractor to withhold all progress payments to a ma-
sonry subcontractor because of brickwork containing some crooked bricks and some
faulty head joints. In Golf Corts; Inc v. Mid-Pacific Country Club, 493 P.2d 1338 (Haw.
1972), there was a good faith withholding when a licensee withheld the amount to which
it thought it was entitled under an oral modification which was later found ineffective. In
Smith v. Empire Sanitary District, 273 P.2d 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), an owner's
withholding of payment to a contractor because it was without funds was found to be in
bad faith.
229. There are, of course, some detailed determinations which must be made at the
boundaries of the standard. As the standard defines the conduct of the parties in terms of
reasonable behavior, the cases which push the limits of the standard must be decided on
their facts. The standard, however, will provide for effective determination of many of
the questions which have arisen under the present standards. See supra part II.D.
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selves from these risks by addressing the issue of withholding within their
agreements.
Courts and legislatures must move toward a clear expression of a sin-
gle coherent withholding standard that minimizes the risks that parties
face when they withhold. This standard must be fair to all parties to the
contract, as well as encourage communication between them. In addi-
tion, it must allow the parties to understand their legal positions and
clearly outline the ways in which the parties may proceed. Finally, the
standard selected must expressly define the rights and responsibilities of
the contracting parties, so that when they confront a situation in which
withholding is appropriate, they are well prepared to make an informed
choice.
